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ABSTRACT 
A complex network of dealers, brokers, financiers, and traffickers continue 
to funnel large quantities of small arms and ammunition into African conflict-
zones despite the presence of United Nations arms embargoes.  Weapons are 
often transported from arms producing countries in Eastern Europe and the post-
Soviet States to remote locations in Africa by civil aircraft.  This thesis will focus 
on the process by which weapons are bought and sold and the illicit nexus of 
arms brokerage and transportation networks that facilitate the deadly trade.  This 
supply chain will be presented as the “anatomy of an arms deal” which can be 
further described using the statistical tools and measures of social network 
analysis.  Selected case studies of proliferation events into the West African state 
of Liberia will be used to construct networks that can be compared to the supply 
chain model and possibly suggest additional points of intervention to halt this 
deadly trade. 
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A. THE PROBLEM OF SMALL ARMS IN AFRICA 
Africa is awash with weapons.  The widespread availability of weapons in 
Africa presents a unique challenge to regional and international organizations 
that make efforts to resolve conflicts and then participate in subsequent 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration projects.  Speaking at a United 
Nations ministerial meeting on security, the former Secretary General of the 
United Nations declared that: 
Small arms have damaged development prospects and imperiled 
human security in every way.  Indeed there is probably no single 
tool of conflict so widespread, so easily available, and so difficult to 
restrict, as small arms.1 
These weapons by themselves are not a root cause of conflict; however, 
the availability of small arms and light weapons2 can “destabilize regions; spark, 
fuel and prolong conflicts; obstruct relief programmes; undermine peace 
initiatives; exacerbate human rights abuses; hamper development; and foster a 
culture of violence.”3  Nowhere in the world are these effects more pronounced 
than in developing regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.  The Human Security 
Centre recently revealed that “[a]t the beginning of the new millennium the battle-
death toll in sub-Saharan Africa was greater than the toll in all other regions 
combined.”4  In its first Human Security Report, this non-governmental 
                                            
1 Kofi Annan, “Statement by the Secretary-General at the Ministerial Meeting of the Security 
on the Question of Small Arms,” United Nations, September 24, 1999, 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/presskit/sheet16.htm (accessed July 27, 2007). 
2 The United Nations defines small arms as “weapons designed for personal use…[to] 
include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light 
machine guns;” and light weapons as “weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a 
crew…[to] include machine-guns, mortars, hand grenades, grenade launchers, portable anti-
aircraft guns and portable missile launchers,” 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/brochure.htm (accessed July 27, 2007). 
3 Statement from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website related 
to small arms and light weapons, http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw.html (accessed 24 August 
2007). 
4 Human Security Centre, The Human Security Report 2005, (Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser 
University, 2005), http://www.humansecurityreport.info/HSR2005_HTML/Part1/index.htm 
(accessed August 24, 2007). 
2 
organization revealed that while the number of conflicts has dropped throughout 
much of the world during the last half-century, sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced a steady rise in violence from World War II until 1991, and then 
remained high until 2002.5  Despite a recent decline in conflict, Africa remains a 
volatile continent characterized by tenuous peace agreements and ineffective 
arms embargoes. 
The availability of small arms in Africa during the late-twentieth century 
can be attributed to a post-Cold War sell-off of formerly state controlled weapons 
stockpiles.  More recently, state-owned and private weapons manufacturing firms 
have recognized the demand for weapons in the world’s conflict zones and 
responded with increased production and proliferation.  While small arms are not 
themselves a root cause of conflict, they can be classified as a precondition for 
violence in underdeveloped regions of the world.  These weapons are available 
in abundance and are flowing into the region from a thriving global arms market.  
The process to buy and transport these weapons is facilitated by a complex 
network of arms dealers, brokers, financiers and traffickers.  Weapons are often 
transported from their origin in state controlled stockpiles or from international 
arms manufacturers to Africa by civil aircraft.  The most proficient arms traffickers 
control their own aircraft through direct ownership or leasing arrangements to 
ensure the safe delivery of their illicit cargoes.   
B. CONTROLLING SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION 
Efforts to regulate the illegal international trafficking of small arms to 
African conflict zones by civil aircraft have been led primarily by the UN.  The 
principle method of enforcement has been the establishment of a number of 
arms embargoes imposed on both state and non-state actors.  These efforts 
have been largely ineffectual considering the claim by Amnesty International that 
“sometimes the embargoes have made it logistically more difficult and expensive 
to acquire the desired arms, but available evidence suggests that on the whole 
violations of UN arms embargoes appear persistent, widespread and 
systematic.”  In fact, as recently as August 2007, Amnesty International’s arms 
                                            
5 Human Security Centre, The Human Security Report 2005. 
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control research manager claimed that aircraft had been observed offloading 
weapons in violation of the current UN embargo on Sudan.  Referencing 
photographs of containers being transferred from an Antonov An-12 cargo 
aircraft to Sudanese Air Force helicopters, the official stated that the “Sudanese 
government is still deploying weapons into Darfur in breathtaking defiance of the 
UN arms embargo and Darfur peace agreements.”6 
Some governments have developed national level instruments to monitor 
and control the illicit trafficking of conventional weapons.  The United States, for 
example, has guidance, procedures, and regulations to monitor and report the 
sale and transfer of small arms to foreign buyers.  The Department of Defense is 
responsible for government to government arms transfers while the State 
Department oversees the licensing and monitoring of commercial exports.7  Part 
of the process to export arms from the U.S. to a foreign buyer is a pre-delivery 
check to review the proposed transfer and post-delivery checks to ensure the 
weapons are being used as intended.  This system of accountability is intended 
to stop third-party transfers in which a perceived destination country is actually a 
transit point for the eventual delivery to a possible prohibited buyer.  The U.S. 
mechanism to control conventional arms transfer is unique within a largely 
unregulated global market that involves numerous government and private 
producers and suppliers of weapons. 
To address the issue of conventional weapons proliferation, the United 
Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs initiated a Programme of Action 
(PoA) “to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons.”  The PoA was agreed upon in 2001 and remains the key international 
agreement on the illicit trade and subsequent misuse of small arms.  The 
objective of this conference was to reinforce and better coordinate efforts to 
                                            
6 “Khartoum ‘defying Darfur embargo,’” BBC News, August 24, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6961066.stm (accessed December 7, 2007). 
7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Conventional Arms Transfers: U.S. Efforts to Control the 
Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons, (Washington, DC: July, 2000), 4. 
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combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons by developing 
standards for use at the national, regional, and global level.8 
1. National Level 
Combating small arms proliferation at the national level involves “laws, 
regulations, and administrative procedures” put in place and enforced by the 
state.9  The focus on national level control of weapons proliferation is shared 
equally between the destination countries that intend to use weapons and the 
origination countries that manufacture or otherwise procure and export weapons.  
There are currently a limited number of explicit prohibitions on arms transfers 
between nations.  National level regulation is often dependent upon non-binding 
codes of conduct “which require exporting states to assess respect for 
fundamental principles of international law by recipient states and to refrain from 
authorizing exports in cases where it is foreseeable that weapons will be used in 
violation of these principle.”10 
2. Regional Level 
Regional alliances are increasingly being leveraged to promote socio-
economic cooperation and address political and security concerns between 
nations.  Examples of regional alliances in Africa include the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development 
Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU).  The UN maintains that these 
alliances can support anti-weapons proliferation initiatives by establishing “trans-
border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law 
enforcement, border and customs control agencies.”11   
3. Global Level 
Finally, at the global level, trade sanctions and arms embargoes are 
among the most common methods to control the illicit delivery of small arms to 
                                            
8 UN, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/15 (New York, NY: UN, July 9-20, 2001). 
9 Ibid, 10. 
10 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “What’s Legal? What’s Illegal?” in Running Guns: The Global 
Black Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 2000), 27. 
11 UN, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, 13. 
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both prohibited state and sub-state actors.  These instruments can be 
implemented by regional alliances or international bodies such as the UN 
Security Council.  The current territorial arms embargoes imposed by the UN 
within sub-Saharan Africa affect Somalia, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast.  
Additionally, the Security Council has imposed embargoes on non-state actors 
within Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the 
Sudan.12  The Security Council can pass a resolution to impose both territorial 
and non-state actor arms embargoes when it determines a “threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression” has occurred that could be 
exacerbated by a flow of weapons.13 
C. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Despite the efforts of individual nations, regional alliances, and 
international bodies to restrict the illicit flow of small arms, profit-motivated 
brokers and transportation agents continue to buy, sell, and transport weapons 
into sub-Saharan Africa.  The most successful traffickers can circumvent national 
licensing requirements and both territorial and non-state actor arms embargoes 
by leading an inclusive business enterprise that combines brokerage, financing, 
and transportation service to successfully deliver illicit cargoes to their clients by 
surreptitious means.  Their clients range from national dictators to guerrilla 
warlords and the payment for services rendered can be in U.S. dollars, business 
concessions, or in exchange for illegally exploited natural resources such as 
diamonds and timber.  
Small arms are transported from faraway markets in Eastern Europe and 
the post-Soviet States to the African continent by both ship and aircraft.  They 
are further transported within Africa by truck, train, and aircraft.  However, 
unscrupulous arms brokers and transportation agents often rely on aircraft alone 
for their rapid and relatively anonymous transportation capabilities.  These 
capabilities are further enhanced by the vast scale of unregulated airspace and 
                                            
12 United Nations Security Council resolutions on arms embargoes can be found under 
“Sanction Committees” on the website http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_structure.html  
13 UN Charter Article 39 quoted by Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “What’s Legal, What’s Illegal?” 
6 
airports that are spread across the African continent.  Additionally, most of 
Africa’s inland regions are fraught with an inadequate terrestrial transportation 
infrastructure that is only further degraded during the rainy seasons.  The 
combination of armed conflict and problematic land transportation “have often 
made air transport the modality of choice for international arms transfers to the 
interior of countries subject to arms embargoes even though they have viable 
seaports such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Sudan and the 
DRC, as well as to land-locked countries when they were renowned for diverting 
arms, such as Burkina Faso, Uganda and Zambia.”14  
The 2005 UN Disarmament Yearbook outlined the Security Council’s 
response to the Secretary General’s concern for the continued proliferation of 
small arms and has sought “international and regional cooperation in identifying 
the origin and transfer of [small arms and light weapons] in order to prevent their 
diversion” to prohibited recipients.15  This thesis will shed light on the origins of 
weapons most often found in the hands of combatants engaged in the world’s 
deadliest conflicts and describe the civil aviation enabled global supply chain that 
continues to create a supply-side market for small arms. 
1. Methodology 
Contemporary arms traffickers have built an extensive and highly 
adaptable supply network designed to circumvent national, regional, and 
international regulatory efforts to clandestinely deliver arms to prohibited buyers.  
This network constitutes a supply chain for the international trans-shipment of 
goods and can be represented as a flow chart of individuals and their associated 
roles that are required to facilitate this transaction between buyers and sellers.  
This qualitative study will rely on literature and case studies made available by 
inter-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations, and non-
governmental organizations, such as the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms 
                                            
14 Amnesty International, Dead on Time: Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to 
Human Rights, ACT 30/008/2006 (Amnesty International, May 10, 2006), 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact300082006 (accessed December 12, 2007), 90. 
15 UN, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, (New York, NY: UN, 2005), 
http://disarmament.un.org/yearbook-2005/DY2005.htm (accessed August 24, 2007). 
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Transfers (NISAT) and Amnesty International, to construct the global supply 
chain of small arms transfers.  This foundation will serve as a point of departure 
for further analysis of trafficking networks. 
Network analysis is not a new academic discipline.  However, it is 
increasingly being applied to the complex law enforcement challenges posed by 
organized criminal activity and international terrorism.  Social network analysis is 
a sub-discipline of network analysis that focuses on the relations that exist 
between a discrete set of individual actors and suggests that these relations are 
more representative of the overall network than the unique attributes of each 
individual actor.  Sociologists suggest that studying the relationships between a 
set of actors is instrumental to the development of useful disruption strategies.16   
Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward used the case of arms-trafficking in West 
Africa as a representation of a complex and mutually reinforcing network 
between warlords, criminals, and terrorists.  The authors stated that “[t]he trade 
in diamonds in exchange for guns and military hardware exists at the intersection 
of the failed nation-states of Africa with tribal warlords who control both natural 
resources and sometimes the organs of state power, such as national banks, 
commerce, and foreign relations.”17  The network constructed by Raab and 
Milward includes African warlords and dictators; rebel and terrorist groups; 
diamond mine owners; and the arms brokers, financiers, and traffickers that 
helped fuel the deadly conflicts of West Africa. 
Social network analysis is used in this study to add another dimension to 
the understanding of the global arms supply chain.  The finite set of actors 
involved in the arms trafficking network includes suppliers, brokers, financiers, 
banking institutions, insurance providers, transportation agents, customs and port 
                                            
16 While there is a comprehensive literature on networks and social network analysis, this 
research will focus on those authors that have applied these analytical techniques to criminal and 
terrorist networks.  These include, and are not limited to Jörg Raab & H. Brinton Milward, “Dark 
Networks as Problems”; Valdis E. Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells”; Stuart Koschade, 
“A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah”; and Kathleen M. Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and 
David Krackhardt, “Destabilizing Networks.”  
17 Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public 
Adminstration Research and Theory 13 (October 2003): 425. 
8 
authorities, and buyers.  Central among these actors are the brokers and 
transportation agents.  Many of the affiliated companies established by 
unscrupulous brokers and transportation agents are intended to further obfuscate 
the delivery of illicit weapons or serve as the non-prohibited destination for arms 
that can further diverted to an embargoed state or sub-state actor.  Upon 
developing a model for the global small arms supply chain, several case studies 
will be presented and used to illustrate the techniques used to clandestinely 
deliver arms to prohibited buyers.  A final analysis should reveal the strength of 
the model and possibly provide the context for new strategies intended to disrupt 
arms trafficking networks.  
2. Research Objectives 
There are two main objectives to this research.  The first is to provide a 
general understanding of the proximate argument that small arms can both 
exacerbate and prolong intrastate conflict.  The background will segue into a 
description of the global small arms supply chain that often relies on the rapid 
and relatively autonomous delivery characteristics of civil aircraft.  This 
description, characterized as the “anatomy of an arms deal” will provide the 
contextual background for further description of small arms proliferation using 
network terms.  The second main objective, therefore, is to demonstrate the use 
of social network analysis to further describe this global supply chain and the 
relational characteristics between individual actors.  The underlying research 
question is: Can the statistical tools and measures of social network analysis 
provide the means to systematically dissect the global small arms supply chain 
and reveal vulnerabilities that are neglected by the national, regional, and 
international counter-proliferation advocates? 
D. PRELUDE TO INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II: Conflict in Africa 
This chapter sets the stage for understanding the role that small arms play 
in African conflicts.  It will not deliver a comprehensive understanding of the root 
cause of conflict in Africa but rather present the issue of small arms proliferation 
and the general widespread availability of small arms as a precondition that acts 
9 
to destabilize regions and subsequently prolong conflict.  The Collier-Hoeffler 
model of civil war onset will be used to demonstrate that the availability of small 
arms and the weak status of nation states are quantifiable conditions that can 
explain intrastate (civil) war in Africa.  The chapter will also include an 
introduction into the role of arms brokers and transportation agents in the 
complex nexus of arms trafficking networks and leaders of African intrastate 
conflicts.  This chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the regulatory 
environment for arms trafficking and civil aviation. 
2. Chapter III: The Global Small Arms Supply Chain 
This chapter is intended to provide a primer for the methods of small arms 
proliferation and specifically the role that civil aircraft play in the networked 
operations of arms traffickers.  The goal is to develop a step-by-step 
understanding of the global small arms supply chain which involves negotiation, 
brokerage, financing, insuring, and delivery.  The focus will be on the illicit deals 
that violate regional or international arms embargoes.  This process will be 
described as “the anatomy of an arms deal,” which can be graphically 
represented as a flow chart of actors and functions.  
3.  Chapter IV: Mapping Proliferation Networks of Liberia 
While Chapter III identifies and defines each actor involved in illicit small 
arms proliferation, this chapter will demonstrate how each of these actors are tied 
together by unique relationships that can be represented as a social network.  To 
demonstrate the validity of the small arms supply chain, four separate case-
studies will be outlined that identify central actors and functions that enabled the 
delivery of small arms despite international prohibitions.  Each of the case 
studies will introduce separate brokers and transportation agents that were 
involved with illicit arms trafficking to the embargoed nation of Liberia during the 
second civil war from 1999 to 2003.   
4. Chapter V: Analytical Findings and Conclusion 
After developing the principle case studies for this thesis, the concluding 
chapter will demonstrate social network analysis techniques and their ability to 
systematically dissect, describe, and analyze an arms trafficking network.  
10 
Instrumental in this analysis is the commonality that exists between seemingly 
discrete arms trafficking networks.  This thesis will close by returning to the 
original research questions.  If successful, the statistical tools and measures of 
social network analysis will be demonstrated as value-added techniques for 
further describing arms trafficking networks. 
11 
II. HISTORY OF WEAPONS AND REGULATION IN AFRICA  
A. NEW WAY OF THINKING ABOUT AFRICA 
The combined effect of the global small arms trade and increasing 
incidence of low intensity conflict have evolved to become a major security threat 
to the modern era.  While the high-profile terrorist attacks of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s have supplanted this threat in most international security forums, 
small arms still present a serious challenge to the developing world.  Many 
developing states have failed or are failing in their attempt to control the political, 
economic, and social impact of low intensity conflict.  One of the greatest 
challenges to the security of these nations is the widespread availability of small 
arms to a variety of state and sub-state actors. 
The end of the Cold War resulted in a decline in regional conflict and a 
rise in intrastate warfare.  These conflicts are waged in part by sub-state actors 
such as insurgents, guerrillas, militias, and paramilitary groups that are equipped 
for the most part with rudimentary conventional weapons from former Cold-War 
stockpiles.  The Human Security Report of 2005 documents this phenomenon 
through a comprehensive and evidence-based analysis of the trends in global 
security.  The report indicates that civil wars, genocides, and international crises 
have all experienced a sharp decline.  The traditional interstate wars and 
intrastate wars have been replaced by low-intensity civil wars “or ‘asymmetric’ 
wars in which high-tech forces fight poorly armed opponents.”18   The report 
identifies the developing regions of the world as the most vulnerable to the 
increased incidence of low intensity intrastate war.  The African sub-continent 
has been described as the “most conflict-ridden and underdeveloped [region] of 
the world and exhibits many of the symptoms which exacerbate the proliferation 
and impact of light weapons.”19 
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Despite this diagnosis for a continent that was largely ignored by the 
international community over the latter half of the twentieth century, development 
and security issues for Africa are currently seeing a sharp increase in 
international discourse.  The United States, for example, established a unified 
military command responsible for a majority of the African continent in October 
2007.  The establishment of this new Africa Command underscores the 
perception of strategic policymakers that the African continent will play a 
significant role in the future of international relations.  From an economic 
standpoint alone, trade between the U.S. and Africa has tripled between 1990 
and 2005.20  Continued development of trade relations, however, is dependent 
upon stable nation-states that can combine good governance with economic 
viability and security from internal conflict. 
This chapter will explore the challenges faced by African nations that 
result from the widespread availability of small arms.  The issue of conventional 
weapons proliferation is not new to the international community.  However, 
traditional analysis and policy recommendations that were dominant during the 
Cold War focused on major weapon systems that were employed and 
proliferated by the two superpowers.  The conventional weapons race that 
involved several proxy governments was largely accepted to be a potential cause 
for conflict and tension.  The issue of small arms proliferations represented “a 
minor aspect of the larger arms traffic and thus not worthy of analysis.”21   
The end of the Cold War shifted this world view on weapons proliferation 
by creating a second and third order effect that can be further explored to 
establish the contextual background for small arms trafficking.  Most significantly, 
this near half-century long standoff ended with enormous stockpiles of weaponry 
amassed by NATO countries and the former Eastern bloc and post-Soviet states.  
These weapons, especially small arms from the Eastern bloc and post-Soviet 
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states, were flooded onto the international market by enterprising arms brokers.  
A majority would find their way to conflict zones of sub-Saharan African and 
South West Asia.  This has resulted in a third order effect of exacerbating and 
prolonging conflicts in the developing regions of the world.  Today these 
weapons are increasingly being provided by the emerging industrial giants such 
as China, who are rapidly opening trade concessions with African nations in the 
pursuit of much needed natural resources.  These emerging suppliers of small 
arms will be further discussed along with a final review of the current national, 
regional, and international instruments designed to combat the spread of small 
arms. 
B. SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM 
In his chapter of Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, titled 
“Causation and the Arms Trade,” Ian Anthony describes the causes of the 
conventional arms trade as both profound and proximate.22  The profound 
causes can be attributed to the existence of armed conflict or perception that 
conflict can occur.  This explains the accumulation of small arms as a tool to 
preserve state sovereignty and deter aggressors.  The United Nations Panel of 
Governmental Experts on Small Arms recognizes this profound case of the arms 
trade but concluded that a causal relationship did not exist between the 
stockpiles of small arms and the conflicts in which they were used.23   
Anthony states that there is no single proximate cause for the arms trade 
but that they are often associated with any number of political, military, or 
economic factors present within both exporting and importing states.24  The 
motivating factors for exporting states range from pure financial gain, to gaining 
economic concessions or expanding political influence.  For arms buyers, both at 
the state and sub-state level, accumulation of weapons can be pursued as a 
                                            
22 Ian Anthony, “Causation and the Arms Trade, with Reference to Small Arms,” in Small 
Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, ed. Jayantha Dhanapala, et al., (Geneva: 
UNIDIR/United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1999), 63. 
23 UN General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
A/52/298 (New York, NY: UN, August 27, 1997), para. 38; quoted in Ian Anthony, “Causation and 
the Arms Trade, with Reference to Small Arms,” in Small Arms Control, 63. 
24 Ian Anthony, “Causation and the Arms Trade, with Reference to Small Arms,” 61-65. 
14 
means to maintain security, enhance status and prestige, or challenge the 
incumbent government regime.  In the case of African conflicts, proximate 
causes for small arms accumulation are often associated with other forms of illicit 
activity such as drug trafficking or mineral exploitation ventures.   
The widespread proliferation and availability of small arms will, ultimately, 
make “it more likely that potential belligerents will choose violence, and not 
negotiation, as the way to satisfy their grievances.”25  This thesis does not 
chronicle the well documented cases of conflict, human rights violations, and 
both criminal and terrorist acts that can be attributed to the availability of small 
arms, but rather it will expose the method by which small arms are transferred 
between suppliers and buyers.  This international trade in small arms constitutes 
a global supply chain of suppliers, buyers, and intermediaries that work to 
negotiate deals and arrange transportation of their deadly goods.  The next 
section will focus on the sources of small arms that have been funneled into 
African conflict zones from the post-Colonial years up to the present.  This will be 
followed by a review of the emerging weapon exporters that have embraced 
rapid globalization to satisfy the worlds abiding demand for small arms. 
1. Collapse of the Soviet Union 
In preparation for global conflict, the diametrically opposed superpowers of 
the Cold War amassed massive quantities of arms, ammunition, and other 
conventional military equipment.  These weapons were stockpiled in depots of 
both the United States and former Soviet Union as well as being dispersed and 
stored by their respective allies around the world.  The combined stockpiling and 
dispersion of weapons resulted in a global proliferation of arms during the half-
century stalemate that would only be surpassed in volume by the immense 
liquidation of stockpiles following the breakup of the Soviet Union.  
Before the end of the Cold War, weapons were flooded into Africa through 
the “practice of arming ideologically opposed factions…. [by] powers with a 
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vested interest in different regional conflicts.”26  The Soviet Union, for example, 
provided arms to a variety of independence or liberation movements including, 
opposition groups in Ethiopia, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) from 1964 onwards, the South West Africa People’s Organization 
(SWAPO) in Namibia from 1961 onwards, the Liberation Front of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) in Mozambique prior to and following independence from Portugal, 
and the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.27  Most 
of these arms deals were conducted to provide sub-state groups with the 
capacity to undermine or overthrow the government of their respective states.  
The end of the Cold War would only exacerbate this flow of weapons as arms 
dealers emerged with the requisite credentials to liquidate state-owned weapons 
to clients that ranged from warlords and guerrilla forces to incumbent and 
opposition leaders of African nations. 
The end of the Cold War and subsequent economic turmoil of the post-
Soviet states resulted in a massive sell-off of military hardware that ranged from 
AK-47 assault rifles to Ilyushin IL-76 cargo aircraft.  This surplus military 
equipment would find its way to new users through both legitimate and illicit 
markets.  The German government, for example, would liquidate former East 
German military wares through trade to less affluent NATO countries, including 
Greece and Turkey.28  Conversely, massive quantities of unneeded weapons 
were dispersed around the world through illicit, black-market channels.  These 
weapons first emerged on the black-market as Soviet soldiers sold off stockpiles 
of weapons while withdrawing from Eastern Europe.29  Then, recognizing the 
financial windfall from moving former military weapons, a number of enterprising 
dealers and brokers would emerge and claim their stake of this lucrative market.  
These individuals would exploit the enormous supply of weapons and the corrupt 
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and often impoverished status of military and government officials to obtain  
high quality weapons at rock bottom prices.   
Viktor Bout, who will be revealed as a central figure in West African arms 
trafficking in Chapter IV, is one such individual who used his business savvy and 
international experience to create a global arms trafficking empire.  Although his 
background is unclear, Bout acknowledges serving as an Air Force officer and is 
a graduate of the Soviet Military Institute of Foreign Languages.  This language 
school was known as a training ground for the GRU (Glavnoje Razvedyvatel'noje 
Upravlenije or Main Intelligence Directorate), which was deeply involved in the 
flow of Russian arms to revolutionary movements and communist client states 
around the World.30  Whether or not Bout was an intelligence agent of the Soviet 
Union, following the end of the Cold War, and at the ripe age of 25, he would 
purchase former Soviet Air Force cargo aircraft and employ their displaced crews 
to transport abandoned state arsenals of weapons to conflict zones in Africa, the 
Middle East, and Latin America.  The logistics network that Bout would construct 
relied on the demand of “former Soviet clients, unstable governments, dictators, 
warlords, and guerilla armies.”31 
2. Globalization 
While the first arms traffickers on the scene in Africa were well connected 
within the former Soviet Union and Easter bloc military bureaucracy, and a range 
of state and sub-state level clients that spanned the continent, the effects of 
globalization would quickly transform the arms trade into a highly complex and 
continually adjusting enterprise.  Phil Williams, a leading scholar in the field of 
transnational organized crime, describes the effect of globalization on financial, 
commercial, transportation, and communication networks as having “enabled 
buyers and sellers to locate each other, identify points of common interest, and 
establish terms of cooperation.”32  As formerly state-owned stockpiles of arms 
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were depleted, arms manufactures would continue to advance the supply-side 
economy of the global arms market through increased production and trade.  
During this time frame, however, the top arms manufacturers no longer simply 
built weapons, but rather they integrated components of weapons that are 
sourced from suppliers located around the globe.  To support this type of 
manufacturing, “production facilities are set up in new, often developing, 
countries, brokers and dealers flourish, technology is traded, and arms 
companies produce their branded weapons in many locations.”33 
The global trade in military quality arms is still dominated by the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.  These five countries 
contributed to an estimated 82 percent of major conventional arms transfers in 
2005.34  However, emerging arms producers and exporters are gaining ground 
and are contributing to a growing segment of the global arms trade.  The 2007 
Small Arms Survey estimates that 60 to 80 percent of all military rifles, assault 
rifles, and carbines are manufactured by producers that acquired the technology 
from others.  This “licensed production” of small arms is increasing to enhance 
the market share and research and development contributions of the licensor 
while at the same time developing the domestic industry and decreasing import 
dependence on the part of the licensee.35 
While globalization is expanding the production potential of the major arms 
suppliers, it can also weaken the states that ultimately fall victim to their 
destructive capability.  H. C. R. Muggah argues that the effect of globalization on 
Africa has been to weaken the state which is unable to compete with new social 
and economic actors who operate across boundaries.36  The global actors in the 
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illicit small arms trade capitalize on the inability of weak states to regulate their 
borders.  Profit motivated actors of the global economy work to reduce trade 
barriers resulting in a massive increase in the flow of freely traded goods.  These 
factors have “facilitated smuggling and illicit arms trafficking and overwhelmed 
state capacities to police their physical and electronic frontiers.”37  The supply of 
this illicit flow of weapons is increasingly being provided by the emerging 
industrial nations who have a vested interest in Africa and its abundant natural 
resources.  
3. Emerging Exporters 
Worldwide military spending in the year 2006 exceeded the highest 
adjusted dollar amount reached during the height of the Cold War.38  Between 
1985 and 2000, military spending doubled in Botswana, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda.39  The Control Arms 
campaign40 claims that this growth in spending is not related to expanding 
defense requirements, but rather the increasing availability of arms in a growing 
global market.  Increased availability of small arms can be attributed to the 
emerging exports of countries such as Brazil, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, 
Singapore, South Korea, South Africa, and Turkey.   
Most of the nations listed above are engaged in the production of 
advanced conventional military hardware which is outside the scope of this 
thesis; however, there are many more countries that are producing the less 
expensive weapons that have become instrumental to African conflicts.  This 
includes at least 92 countries that produce small arms, at least 14 of which are 
manufacturing the ubiquitous Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle or one of its 
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derivatives.41  Recent efforts to document the source of Africa’s conflict arms 
estimate that 95 per cent of the most commonly used weapons in Africa have 
origins from outside the continent.42  The most prevalent weapon is the AK-47 
assault rifle which has become symbolic of guerrilla movements, opposition 
groups, and terrorist organizations around the world.  The AK-47, described as 
“the weapon that changed the face of war,” has increased the level of destruction 
between warring groups and due to its low weight and simplicity in design and 
operation has enabled combatants to enlist child soldiers into many of the world’s 
bloodiest intrastate conflicts.43 
While not currently the largest supplier of weapons to Africa, China is a 
quickly growing arms producer and has been the topic of a growing multilateral 
discourse related to international trade standards.  Longstanding trade networks 
between China and Africa are increasingly being leveraged to help fuel China’s 
rapid emergence on the global market place.  The past few years have seen “an 
increasingly confident and prosperous China [initiate] a wave of diplomacy 
designed to expand its trade and influence throughout the third world.”44  
Chinese efforts have been focused on resource-rich countries such as Angola, 
Guinea, Nigeria, and Sudan.  Consequently, weapons such as the Chinese Type 
56, a derivative of the Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle, have made their way to 
the stockpiles of groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).  The LRA is 
a rebel guerrilla army operating from northern Uganda and parts of Sudan who 
have been accused of widespread humanitarian rights violations while pursuing a 
region ruled in accordance with the Ten Commandments.45  Western nations 
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have been quick to criticize China for its unconditional support of government 
regimes and sub-state actors commonly known to perpetrate egregious human 
rights violations.  Chinese agreements with suspect government regimes, such 
as Sudan and Zimbabwe, include “low-cost loan guarantees that subvert 
international lending requirements” in turn for resource concessions to include oil 
exploration and extraction rights.46 
Another consequence of the Chinese influence in Africa is expanded 
concessions on weapons sales.  Chinese Type 56 assault rifles, for example, are 
increasingly finding their way to African conflict zones.47  These concessions 
became evident following the charges against Dutch-national Gus van 
Kouwenhoven for allegations of crimes against humanity during his tenure as 
president of the Liberian-based Oriental Timber Company.  Van Kouwenhoven 
was arrested in Rotterdam, Netherlands, in March 2005 after it was discovered 
that he brokered an arms deal involving Chinese weapons shipped into Liberia in 
violation of the UN arms embargo against the Charles Taylor regime.48  It should 
come as no surprise that during the timeframe of violations, van Kouwenhoven’s 
company held the largest logging concessions in Liberia and was providing 
timber to China.  The effect of these concessions and other sources of weapons 
in Africa have had an immeasurable effect on development and the prospects for 
peace that still confound efforts to end the intrastate conflicts of the eastern 
provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Darfur region of Sudan. 
C. THE ROLE OF SMALL ARMS IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS 
Amnesty International claims that “between one-third and three-quarters of 
all grave human rights violations and 85 per cent of [reported] killings…over the 
past decade have involved the use of small arms and light weapons.49  The 
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United Nations claims that the availability of small arms plays a significant role in 
“sustaining conflicts, in exacerbating violence, in contributing to the displacement 
of innocent populations and threatening international law, and in fuelling crime 
and terrorism.”50  These claims are only further reinforced by a wide body of 
literature that suggests small arms and armed violence are one of the greatest 
threats to the peace, stability, and development of Africa. 
While Cold-War era military depots have been largely depleted of surplus 
small arms, rapid globalization and the emergence of new arms producing 
nations have ensured that supply-side conditions continue to provide sources of 
weaponry for African conflicts.  In fact, many of these emerging exporters are 
able to provide cheaper weapons which the Small Arms Survey demonstrates to 
increase the risk of civil war, independent of other conflict risk factors.51  These 
conflict risk factors, or root causes of conflict, are often measured through the 
evaluation of “socio-economic development, effective democracy and a credible 
law and order mechanism.”52   
Small arms alone are rarely attributed as a root cause of conflict, however, 
they are widely accepted to be a precondition for violence that can exacerbate 
and increase the lethality of conflict.  Presented as an independent variable, 
therefore, the availability of small arms is a quantifiable element that can be 
controlled to reduce levels of violence.  Economists Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler advance this argument by suggesting that the motivating factors for 
conflict are tied to measurable conditions of greed and that fighting will only occur 
with the presence of atypical opportunities to combatants on either side of a 
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conflict.53  Using this context, Collier and Hoeffler developed a model to predict 
the onset of intrastate conflict based on opportunity as the determining factor to 
predict the onset or nonoccurrence of armed conflict.   
The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset incorporates factors that 
contribute to atypical opportunities such as the available finances of both 
incumbent regimes and potential opposition groups.  Available capital is thus 
compared to the overall cost of rebellion and the military advantage of the 
opposition group to the state security apparatus.  The sources of finance can be 
further divided by the circumstances that generate profitable opportunities to 
include the exploitation of resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions 
from external governments.54  Availability of finances can buy, among other 
things, weapons, which further create the conditions of atypical opportunities 
contributed by the Collier-Hoeffler model to increase the likelihood of civil war. 
Considering weapons an a quantitative indicator for the opportunity to 
rebel, which is demonstrated by the Collier-Hoeffler model as a determining 
factor for intrastate conflict, provides the rational to focus on intervention 
strategies of the global supply chain of small arms.  The rational is further 
reinforced by the recent research of the Control Arms Campaign to estimate the 
economic cost of armed conflict to Africa’s development.  Using factors such as 
the decline in gross domestic product (GDP) for countries at war, the cost of 
armed conflict for 23 African countries was conservatively estimated to be $284 
billion lost between 1990 and 2005.  This estimated value, which represents an 
average annual loss of 15 per cent of GDP, “amounts to an average of $18 
[billion] per year lost by Africa due to armed conflict.”55  The underlying theme to 
the Control Arms effort to quantify the cost of armed conflict is to represent a lost  
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opportunity for investment in stability and development initiatives that could have 
mitigated the complex political, commercial, and socio-economic causes for 
conflict.  
Recognizing that small arms are a precondition for conflict and 
considering the economic cost to development that can be attributed to armed 
conflict, controlling the transfer of small arms “is therefore an indispensable 
element in the effort to make a more peaceful world.”56  The final section of this 
chapter will introduce the reader to the international, regional, and state level 
efforts to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and hold accountable those 
individuals, organizations, and states responsible for the repercussions. 
D. CONTROLLING THE SPREAD OF SMALL ARMS  
The watershed event for international action against the spread of small 
arms occurred at the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat 
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
held in New York from 9 to 20 July 2001.  The most recent conference to review 
the implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA) ended without consensus 
on an outcome document, but it did “succeed in recalling the issue of small arms 
and light weapons to the attention of the international community.”57  During the 
opening session, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated: 
Our energy, our emphasis, and our anger is directed against illegal 
weapons, not legal ones. Out priorities are effective enforcement, 
better controls and regulation, safer stockpiling, and weapons 
collection and destruction. Our targets remain unscrupulous arms 
brokers, corrupt officials, drug trafficking syndicates, criminals and 
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who ruin lives and destroy in minutes the labour of years. To halt 
the destructive march of armed conflict and crime, we must stop 
such purveyors of death.58 
It is important to note that the “purveyors of death” who broker weapons 
deals and arrange trans-shipment rely on a variety of modes for transportation 
which include trucks, aircraft, and maritime vessels.  A variety of spatial and 
temporal factors will influence the decision to use one or multiple methods over 
others.  A United Nations Monitoring Group investigating the implementation of 
the embargo on Somalia noted a downward trend in the use of aircraft to 
smuggle weapons while the use of sea transport has increased due to the 
relative ease of arranging shipments and the overall cost effectiveness.59  The 
Group identified the commercial supply chain that provides weapons to actors on 
both sides of the Somali political divide to “generally [consist] of buyers 
(recipients) and associates (individuals and organizations), sellers and 
middlemen, the shipment itself, transport and finally the means and methods of 
payment.”60  In other regions, such as the conflict zones of West Africa and the 
Eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, aircraft remain the 
preferential means to traffic weapons.  This is largely due to the isolated 
locations for delivery and the presence of inadequate road networks that often 
become impassible during the rainy season.61 
The means of transport is an independent variable in a process that 
engages many of the same elements within the supply chain including brokers, 
financiers, and the transportation agents that ultimately determine the mode of 
delivery.  Some of the instruments advocated by the 2001 PoA focus on mode-
specific means of transportation, however, most policy has been focused on the 
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larger proliferation system with recommendations at the national, regional, and 
international level to combat illicit arms proliferation. 
1. National Level Regulations 
Most of the measures agreed upon by states participating in the 2001 
Programme of Action (PoA) were focused on enhancing national level 
regulations and administrative procedures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the 
illicit trade in small arms.  All signatories agreed that central to these efforts is the 
identification of groups and individuals “engaged in the illegal manufacture, trade, 
stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as financing for acquisition, or illicit 
small arms and light weapons.”62  While the conference would not create legally 
binding instruments to enforce small arms export, import, transit, or retransfer 
methods, it would create the framework that many nations have used to develop 
strict licensing procedures. 
The global supply chain for small arms will be outlined in detail throughout 
Chapter III of this thesis.  For the purpose of this chapter, however, a brief 
introduction is necessary to further discuss the regulatory environment that 
unscrupulous individuals, groups, and nations will exploit to engage in the illicit 
trade of small arms.  To outline the arms acquisition process and provide a basis 
to explain national arms export policies, Ian Anthony describes arms sales as an 
act of state policy.63  By using the state as the unit of analysis, Anthony further 
disaggregates buyers and sellers into the categories represented in Table 1.  The 
arms transfers that are relevant to this thesis and those that will be used to 
construct the global supply chain of small arms transfers can be accommodated 
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   Supplier  






 Government  
(armed forces) ← ← ← 
End-user Government 
(paramilitary forces) ← ← ← 
 Licensed 
manufacturer ← ← ← 
 Non-state  
armed forces ← ← ← 
 
Table 1.   Matrix of Suppliers and Recipients in Small Arms Transfers64 
 
To coordinate weapon sales between the suppliers and end-users 
identified on this matrix are a number of intermediaries that are each responsible 
for one or multiple segments of the supply chain.  The most central of these 
figures are the arms brokers who can be described as the “middlemen who 
organize arms transfers between two or more parties.”65  For the context of this 
section, it is important to note that brokers are involved in both the mediation or 
negotiation of arms deals and the associated activities of arms transfers to 
include making arrangements for “transportation, financing, insurance and the 
provision of technical services” to their prospective clients.66 
The activity of brokers and those involved in illicit weapons deals has been 
the focus of United Nations conferences that followed the 2001 PoA.  In 
December 2005 the General Assembly decided to establish a group of 
governmental experts “to consider further steps to enhance international 
cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small 
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arms and light weapons.”67  As of June 2007, this group of 25 member states 
has adopted a consensus report to be considered by the General Assembly 
which “suggests a set of optional elements for inclusion in national legislation, 
and [calls] for consistent attention to the issue of illicit brokering in small arms at 
future United Nations meetings.”68  The United States has responded to illicit 
brokerage activity by declaring that weak or non-existent national laws and 
regulations “allows arms brokers to procure military-grade weapons for terrorist 
and violent insurgent groups, often in violation of United Nations sanctions as 
well as national laws, with impunity.”69 
The overwhelming response of the United Nations and many civil society 
organizations toward illicit brokerage activities has been focused on establishing 
common national systems of control.  The national legislation and administrative 
procedures to regulate this activity can be divided between regulating the 
individual brokers by establishing or strengthening licensing requirements and 
regulating individual arms transfers by introducing comprehensive export and 
import licensing procedures.  Additionally, regulatory efforts that target arms 
brokers are often expanded to include the transportation agents that are 
instrumental in the shipment of goods between suppliers and end-user.  As will 
be demonstrated later in this thesis, the line between brokers and transportation 
agents is often ill-defined.   
a. Licensing Brokers and Transportation Agents 
The subject of licensing procedures for the transfer of weapons and 
licensing procedures that govern the activity of both brokers and transportation 
agents is a principal component to most policy recommendations designed to 
curb the illicit spread of small arms.  Since adopting the 1996 “Framework for 
Arms Control,” the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)                                             
67 UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/81 of The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
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has continued to advocate a strict licensing regiment to control import and export 
activities and the individuals and organizations involved.70  This model for 
licensing arms import, export, brokerage, and transportation procedures is the 
most widely accepted and applicable to this thesis considering the participatory 
status of the most of Africa’s arms suppliers within the OSCE.  The OSCE 
requires that participating states use national licensing procedures on shipments 
of small arms imported into, or exported from their territory “to prevent the 
diversion of the small arms to any party other than the declared recipient.”71 
Enhancing the licensing requirements for brokers and 
transportation agents involved in the small arms trade is becoming increasingly 
accepted as an effective means to limit illicit arms transfers.  The International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) has adopted a mechanism to register freight 
forwarders, an intermediary between brokers and transport agents; however, this 
has not yet translated into a binding international requirement for agents who 
handle air freight.72  The lack of systematic and standardized registration and 
licensing requirements leads brokers and transportation agents to shift their 
activities to territories with nominal restrictions.  The same phenomenon is 
evident in the often vague characterizations of exactly what an arms broker or 
transport agent is responsible for.  The United States was one of the first 
countries to require that arms brokers are licensed and further considers 
financing, freight forwarding, and transportation as functions of brokering.73  This 
broad interpretation of arms brokerage activities has been adopted by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which requires 
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member states to register its citizens, and companies that are brokering small 
arms to include financial and transportation agents.74 
b. Licensing Individual Arms Deals 
Whether licensed or not, arms brokers and transportation agents 
are subject to specific regulation each time they engage in the export of 
controlled commodities.  The irregularity of national regulations on export activity, 
however, has resulted in both brokers and transportation agents avoiding nations 
with strict rules and practices while exploiting others.75  This practice, known as 
“third-country” or “third-party” brokering involves a weapons shipment that is “not 
exported, imported or transited through the country from which the broker 
operates.”76  Nations lacking strict legislation on brokering activities, therefore, 
have become havens for unscrupulous agents who would otherwise be stymied 
by strict governmental oversight in their home country. 
While there is a limited number of explicit prohibitions on weapons 
proliferation, national level export controls are among the body of law that when 
combined, will act to limit the freedom of a state to export weapons.77  The U.S. 
government, for example, mandates the monitoring and reporting of small arms 
and light weapons transfers under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign 
Assistance Act.  The Arms Export Control Act divides responsibility for licensing, 
monitoring, and reporting the export of small arms and light weapons among the 
executive branches.  Specifically, the Department of Defense is responsible for 
government-to-government arms transfers while the State Department licenses 
and monitors commercial arms exports.78  This legislation recognizes the U.S. 
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concern for the widespread proliferation of conventional weapons and calls for 
“greater global efforts to restrain transfers of these items to regions of conflict.”79   
Despite the efforts of the United States and several other countries, 
illicit proliferation remains widespread because of inadequate control on 
authorized transfers and losses due to inadequate management or security of 
legitimate weapon stockpiles.80  The lack of control over weapons transfers can 
results in the diversion of an otherwise legitimate arms transfer to an 
unauthorized recipient either while the weapons are in transit or after they have 
been delivered.  Such transfers occur “as a result of inadequate or inconsistent 
national regulations or systems, poor enforcement practices, or due to deliberate, 
corrupt or neglectful performance by some officials, in one or more of the states 
responsible for regulating the transfer.”81   
Speaking before the United Nations group of governmental experts 
on illicit brokering in 2006, Nicholas Marsh of the International Action Network on 
Small Arms (IANSA) recommended that arms brokers “may not take possession 
of the arms in question; brokers should be registered by governments; specific 
brokering activities should require individual licenses before they are carried out; 
governments should exchange information on brokers… [and] legal sanctions 
should be introduced to punish those parties that do not abide by brokering 
regulations.”82  The African continent is particularly susceptible to exploitation by 
unscrupulous brokers because of, among other factors, ineffective governmental 
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control, open borders, and a lack of resources and information necessary to 
provide national or regional level oversight of the problem.83  As a result, regional 
alliances have been formed to address the individual weaknesses of member 
states. 
2. Regional Efforts 
Controlling the illicit flow of arms to prohibited end-users is dependent 
upon the ability of individual states to monitor imports of specific goods entering 
their international ports or crossing state lines.  The states most susceptible to 
armed violence in Africa, however, often lack “the necessary equipment, training 
and manpower for border control, while arms smugglers exploit the un-patrolled 
areas between checkpoints.”84  These resource constraints extend to 
international ports, specifically airports, where port authorities or customs officials 
are either lacking in capability or susceptible to corruption payments that are 
often used to facilitate illicit import activity.  Variations on the lack of national 
export and import control or oversight of ports and borders can be mitigated by 
regional agreements. 
There are several regional alliances present in Africa which are organized 
to address a variety of economic and security concerns.  The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) agreed in 1998 to strengthen their control on 
arms transfers as part of a wider Regional Action Programme on Light Arms.85  
This led to the 2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other 
Related Material which aims to “promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange 
of information and experience in the Region to prevent, combat, and eradicate 
the illicit manufacturing of, excessive and destabilizing use and accumulation of, 
trafficking in, possession and use of, firearms, ammunition and other related 
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materials.”86  In October, 1998, the member states of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) declared a voluntary moratorium on the 
import, export, and manufacture of small arms.  This moratorium has since been 
extended and “has emerged as a vital instrument for micro-disarmament to the 
extend of being a model to other sub-regions.”87 
In contrast to these non-legally binding agreements, the Nairobi Protocol, 
which was signed in 2004 and entered into force in May 2006, is tailored to the 
regional concerns of East Africa and requires its member states88 to implement 
the stated provisions.89  Taking the lead on implementation is Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda which are addressing the illicit small arms trade 
through development of new legislation, defining national objectives, and 
implementing action plans in coordination with the Regional Center on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons.90   
The regional alliances to combat small arms proliferation and misuse in 
Africa, including the SADC, ECOWAS, and the Nairobi Protocol, can provide a 
basic framework for the enforcement of anti-proliferation initiatives by 
criminalizing illicit trafficking, manufacturing, possession, and misuse of small 
arms and developing specific legislation to regulated the import of small arms.  
Regional alliances also affect weapon producing countries as evidenced by the 
1993 agreement between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) on the Criteria on Conventional Arms Transfers.  This agreement 
requires that exporting governments avoid transfers that are likely to result in 
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human rights violations.91  This action initiated subsequent agreements such as 
the 1998 European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers and the 2002 
Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons.92  
The intent to control exports from arms producing countries such as the 
member states of the OSCE can be lost, however, through the practice of 
licensed production of small arms.  While the technology for weapons production 
can originate from a country that complies with international standards for arms 
exports, “they retain little or no control over production levels or the onward 
export of arms produced overseas under license.”93  In July 2006, Russia, a 
member-state of the OSCE, authorized the licensed production of its new AK-103 
rifle in Venezuela with the imposed condition that no rifles would be exported 
without prior consent.  Despite this agreement, there are no binding global 
standards for such regulation and many governments have not exercised 
meaningful control over licensed weapons export that they would not allow 
themselves.94 
Another role of regional alliances that receive attention in counter-
proliferation discussions is port and border security and the systems to monitor 
trucks, aircraft, and ships that carry freight across borders and into international 
ports.  Regulating and monitoring air traffic over Africa is complicated by the near 
complete lack of radar coverage across much of the continent.  Furthermore, 
functional radar sites are limited to providing approach and departure control for 
aircraft at a limited number of large international airports.  To monitor aircraft 
transiting the airspace between these locations, flight information regions (FIRs) 
have been established to provide both an information and alert service.95  In 
western Africa, for example, the FIRs are “managed either by agencies to which 
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governments have delegated responsibility, or by state managed 
administrations.”96  West African airspace is divided into a number of jointly 
operated FIRs, such as the Roberts and Accra FIR, which manage Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and Benin, Sao Tomé, and Togo, respectively.  Ghana 
manages its own airspace.97  
While the FIRs consolidate national level air traffic management 
capabilities into regional organizations, they won’t guarantee corrupt aviation 
practices by individual countries.  Following the release of the United Nations 
Panel of Experts report on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195), Liberia decided to take 
control of its own airspace which had previously been managed by the Roberts 
FIR in Conakry, Guinea.  This decision was most likely attributed to the 
compliance of the Roberts FIR with United Nations investigator requests for flight 
records which revealed the occurrence of several sanction busting flights into 
Liberia.  The United Nations subsequently commented that every state has a 
right to control its own airspace and doesn’t think the issue should be subject to 
any sanctions.98  While there was no intervention to prevent the transfer of 
authority over airspace from the Roberts FIR to Liberia, the issue was dropped 
following President Charles Taylor’s ouster in 2003.   
Enhancing the control of airspace and the security capacity in ports is 
instrumental to preventing the unauthorized diversion of legitimate arms 
shipments.  Diversions occur when an arms deal is made by initially identifying a 
legitimate buyer as the final recipient of weapons.  At some point along the 
supply chain, the shipment is diverted from the legitimate buyer to a prohibited 
recipient by using one of several techniques that often involve corrupt officials or 
fraudulent documents.  The 2001 United Nations PoA specifically addressed the 
incident of diversion and the requirements to verify end-users, monitor the 
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transshipment process, and provide post-delivery verification of arms use.99  
Verification of an authorized small arms transfer can be accomplished by 
numerous methods ranging from “mobile patrols and checkpoints along frontiers 
and monitors at airports and seaports to intercepts at sea, the use of maritime 
and aerial assets, including satellite surveillance, provided from national, 
multilateral and regional resources.”100 
Monitoring for potential diversions is a responsibility of individual nations 
and is enhanced through effective cooperation within regional alliances.  These 
multilateral bodies can act to pool national resources and mitigate the challenges 
that result from largely unregulated territory and airspace which is commonly 
exploited by pilots who fly illicit cargoes to prohibited recipients.  Regional 
alliances are also instrumental to the enforcement of arms embargoes, which are 
the most common instrument of the international community to restrict illicit 
proliferation activity. 
3. Role of the International Community 
Conflicts such as the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sierra Leone, and Liberia, in addition to the current genocide in the Darfur region 
of Sudan, have prompted the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against 
both geographically bounded states and non-territorial actors.  Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to use sanctions to “maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”101  Sanctions used by the Security 
Council range from comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more 
targeted measures such as arms embargoes and travel bans.  Biting the Bullet, a 
joint project between International Alert, Saferworld, and the University of 
Bradford, United Kingdom, credits arms embargoes as “one of the principal tools 
of states in seeking to prevent, limit and bring an end to armed conflict and 
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human rights abuses.”102  Embargoes, however, are generally not unilateral 
instruments but rather mandated by regional or international organizations.  The 
2001 United Nations PoA considers embargoes to be a global measure that can 
prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms.103  The veracity of 
embargoes is codified in Chapter VII of the Charter which declares that states 
“have a legal obligation to comply strictly with arms embargoes imposed by the 
Security Council.”104   
The UN Security Council is responsible for monitoring both territorial and 
non-state actor arms embargoes.  The African continent is currently subject to 
territorial arms embargoes against the Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Somalia.  
Additionally, there are non-state actor arms embargoes targeting groups within 
Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and 
Sudan, in addition to al-Qaeda and associated persons.105  The history of 
sanctions against Liberia goes back to November, 1992, when the Security 
Council adopted resolution 788 imposing a “general and complete embargo on 
all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia.”  During the first civil 
war in Liberia, the United Nations delegated the responsibility of enforcing the 
territorial arms embargo to the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).106  By 1998, a non-state arms embargo was extended to the rebel 
group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which operated primarily in neighboring  
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Sierra Leone.107  The current embargo, mandated in March 2001 as part of UN 
Security Council resolution 1343, was included within a wider package of 
sanctions.108   
Complicating the regulatory effect of sanctions and embargoes to prevent 
the illicit trafficking of small arms are the limited resources at the national and 
regional level and the continual adjustments made by unscrupulous arms 
traffickers to stay in business.  Following the delegation of enforcing West African 
arms embargo to ECOWAS, the UN has remained guarded in their overall 
assessment and noted that the region “is still awash with small arms.”109 
E. SUMMARY 
The future development and prosperity of African nations is dependent 
upon preventing conflict.  The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset suggests 
that the availability of small arms represents an opportunity for opposition groups 
to rival incumbent government regimes and thus instigate intrastate conflict.  The 
United Nations in addition to several civil society organizations conclude that 
small arms can both exacerbate and prolong conflict, especially in developing 
regions of the world such as Africa.  Despite the near-exhaustion of Eastern 
European and the post-Soviet states weapons stockpiles, emerging arms 
producers are capitalizing on the tenets of globalization to continue the deadly 
supply-side economy of the global arms trade. 
While the 2001 United Nations PoA to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects has established 
the framework for national, regional, and international progress toward disrupting 
the spread of small arms, there is still work to be done.  As evidenced by recent 
cases of sanction busting weapons flights into the Democratic Republic of Congo 
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and Sudan, unscrupulous arms traffickers have managed to stymie regulatory 
attempts to halt their deadly trade.  To better inform policy makers working to 
disrupt illicit international arms trafficking networks, more empirics are needed as 
to the principal actors and functions that combine to enable the flow of this supply 
chain.  The next chapter will develop this understanding by constructing “the 
anatomy of an arms deal” which will be used in further analysis of Liberian arms 
trafficking networks that were active during the second civil war. 
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III. THE GLOBAL SMALL ARMS SUPPLY CHAIN 
A. WHY SMALL ARMS? 
The post-Cold War liquidation of small arms and subsequent proliferation 
of weapons into sub-Saharan African conflict zones was generally accomplished 
through illicit transfers.  ‘Illicit’ arms transfers can be defined as “those that occur 
outside the control, or against the wishes, of exporting states.”110  The problems 
that arise from illicit proliferation of small arms has evolved to a level of 
magnitude that restricts the developmental prospects of African states and 
further handicaps their ability to compete in the global economy.  Additionally, the 
availability of small arms is one of several elements that when combined can 
provide an opposition group with the required capacity to wage war against the 
incumbent government.111  Despite the threat associated with the widespread 
availability of small arms, the principal proliferation concerns of most developed 
nations remain fixed on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction.112  The fact remains, however, that with the exception of isolated 
cases such as Pakistan’s proliferation of nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and 
North Korea, trafficking weapons of mass destruction are either extremely rare or 
not publicly documented. 
Unlike chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, small arms, or the “$10 
Weapon of Mass Destruction,” have been widely proliferated throughout the 
world through both legitimate and illicit transfers.  Cases of illicit small arms 
trafficking have been well documented by groups such as the United Nations 
panels of experts that are assembled to investigate sanction violations to 
prohibited regimes and sub-state actors.  These cases provide the empirics to 
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construct a global supply chain of small arms proliferation.  The previous chapter 
illustrated the role that small arms play to exacerbate and prolong conflict and the 
current national, regional, and international regulatory efforts to control arms 
export, trans-shipment and import.  This next chapter will make use of the 
available literature on small arms trafficking to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the supply chain.  To develop this “anatomy of an arms deal,” 
each of the primary actors and their associated roles in arms trafficking will be 
identified.  This will set the stage for further description of the network through 
the use of social network analysis.  
B. THE ANATOMY OF AN ARMS DEAL 
A common observation made by multiple case studies of the most prolific 
arms traffickers is their tendency to broker and transport anything to anyone.  
Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun recently wrote an exposé on Viktor Bout, who 
is described as the world’s most notorious arms trafficker.  In detailing the 
worldwide network of logistics that sustains the Bout enterprise, the authors 
describe his reputation “to deliver everything from fresh-cut flowers, frozen 
poultry, and U.N. peacekeepers to assault rifles and surface-to-air missiles.”113  
While establishing his comprehensive air cargo network, Bout learned that 
aircraft can’t make money when flying empty and therefore flights that had 
delivered weapons from the former eastern European and post-Soviet state 
stockpiles into Africa would return with commodities that could easily be sold in 
distant marketplaces.  The fundamentals of transporting gladiolas, therefore, are 
not that different that that of AK-47s.   
The global small arms supply chain, whether it constitutes legitimate or 
illicit transactions, is a highly complex process that involves several steps to be 
coordinated through a network of individuals, companies, and government 
authorities.  Most of the literature on small arms and light weapon proliferation 
divide the process into two broad categories.  First is the act of sourcing and 
purchasing the weapons.  The central figure throughout this process is the arms 
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broker who will act to interpret customer requirements, source the most 
appropriate weapons, and make arrangements for the purchase.  During this 
process, the broker is likely to be involved with licensing, financing, insuring, and 
arranging transportation of the goods.  The second broad category of an arms 
deal involves the continuation of the delivery process which is typically 
orchestrated by transportation agents.  Just like brokering, the transportation 
process can involve several additional intermediaries who must navigate the 
litany of required authorizations and make arrangements with the ultimate 
transporters of goods.  Often at the forefront of this process is a freight forwarder 
who works between brokers and transportation agents to provide shipping cost 
estimates and generate the required documents to complete a sale.  Also 
involved are the transportation operators, customs and port authorities, and air 
traffic controllers who facilitate the transit of aircraft.  These actors and their 
associated functions are accommodated below in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1.   Small Arms Supply Chain Flowchart 
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This flowchart sets the stage for a detailed discussion of each actor and 
their associated functions within the supply chain.  The next section will start by 
describing the buyers and sellers of arms and explain their sources of weapons 
and motivations for purchase.  Following this introduction will be a detailed 
description of each intermediary that exists between buyers and sellers who act 
to facilitate an arms deal.  Developing an understanding at this level is essential 
to the design and implementation of policies that intend to disrupt the process.  
This will be done by dissecting the anatomy of an arms deal and then further 
demonstrated by selected case studies and the application of social network 
analysis.   
1. Buyers and Sellers 
An interstate arms deal will involve the organs of national power 
considering that both buyers and sellers will be involved in a process that 
requires government authorized licenses for export, import, and trans-shipment 
of weapons. 114  The proximity between the buyer or seller and state will vary as 
either one can range from a private individual or organization operating at the 
sub-state level all the way up to and including the state itself.  Recalling Ian 
Anthony’s matrix of suppliers and buyers presented in Chapter II, there are a 
variety of arms purchasing scenarios that range from state-to-state transfers to 
non-state actors purchasing from private trading companies.115  
The buyers most often associated with illicit grey market deals range from 
prohibited state-level actors such as government security or paramilitary forces to 
sub-state actors such as warlords, insurgent groups, and criminal or terrorist 
organizations.116  The world’s premier gunrunner, Viktor Bout, included among 
his clients in the 1990 and early 2000’s Ahmed Shah Massoud of the Northern 
Alliance, UNITA rebels in Angola, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and Libya’s leader 
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Muammar el-Qaddafi.117  It is interesting to note that Bout’s magnanimous 
tendency to stay neutral in many regional conflicts was demonstrated by his 
commensurate arms trafficking services provided to Afghanistan’s Taliban and 
Angolan government forces, each of which were battling the Northern Alliance 
and UNITA, respectively. 
The recipients of weapons in interstate arms deals can also be 
represented by front organizations acting on behalf of prohibited buyers.  
Legitimate procurement agencies can initiate the authorization for an arms 
purchase that will ultimately be diverted to an illicit end-user.  Industrial agents 
also buy weapons components or technologies that are combined for the 
licensed production of weapons outside of the country of origin.118  A recent 
example of this phenomenon is the licensed production of Russian Kalashnikov’s 
in Venezuela.119  While the country of origin may place conditions on this type of 
arrangement, it is ultimately unable to control future sales and proliferation of 
weapons constructed in a third-country. 
A company spokesman for Izmash, one of the Russian manufacturers of 
Kalashnikov assault rifles, estimates that only 10-12 per cent of the million 
Kalashnikov rifles sold annually originate from licensed production.120  The 
remaining weapons are manufactured around the world and sold through a 
variety of companies that provide arms sales related services.  These range from 
small “fly-by-night” firms that are established to perform a limited number of deals 
to the large well known state-run companies that dominate Eastern European 
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and Russian arms markets.121  These arms trading firms, or exporters, can “be a 
direct agent of the government or an economic agent operating at arms length 
from the government.”122   
Since the international arms market is heavily influenced by the state, the 
motivations for selling weapons go beyond simple financial gain.  Payments for 
arms can be made in political, commercial, or financial terms.  Political payments 
include favors and concessions that can buy a selling country regional influence 
or expanded national security.  Commercial payments include deals for counter-
trade and are usually leveraged by the buying nation to bolster the sales of its 
own exports.  Countries that are subject to arms prohibitions generally prefer 
pure financial arrangements that are easier to hide at the international level.123   
As previously described, the majority of regulations on arms suppliers are 
mandated at the national level.  Since the 2001 United Nations Programme of 
Action on Small Arms the efficacy of controls on arms suppliers have been 
inconsistent.  Suppliers and trading firms in nations with strong controls on 
weapons exports have increasingly relied on the establishment of third-country 
foreign subsidiaries through which to route transactions.124  This is one of the 
most common loopholes exploited by arms dealers who would otherwise be 
stymied by the restrictions on direct state-to-state sales.  Even within states that 
monitor and enforce arms export standards, trading firms can win favors with the 
organs of state commerce through corruption payments.  This added cost, which 
is simply added to the manufacturing costs or individual commissions on weapon 
deals, can pave the way for delivering arms that would otherwise be prohibited  
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for export.125  A central figure in such deals is the arms broker, one of several 
intermediaries that operate between buyers and suppliers in the small arms 
supply chain. 
2. Negotiating and Arms Deal: The Role of Brokers 
Arms deals, whether legal, illegal, or occupying the wide margin of space 
between these imprecise boundaries, involves the “import, export, trans-
shipment, re-export, intangible transfer, [and] licensed movement during 
production, brokering, and transport” of weapons.126  Navigating the complex 
bureaucratic and regulatory requirements to move weapons and acting on behalf 
of the buyer or seller is the arms broker.  There are no precise definitions of an 
arms broker or brokering activity within the lexicon of individual states’ legal 
framework.  However, a broker is generally accepted to be the person or legal 
entity that facilitates the “transfer of arms between persons in different third 
countries.”127  
Most arms deals will involve one or multiple brokers who act to coordinate 
“buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers, and insurers to make a deal.”128  The 
brokerage process can “involve two or more countries other than that in which 
the broker is located.”129  The attractiveness of using a broker for an illicit arms 
deal is largely due to the added layer of obfuscation that a third party can 
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provide.130  Additionally, the arms manufacturers and suppliers can be subject to 
government audits while payments and other records of transactions through 
private brokers can be protected from scrutiny by bank secrecy laws.131  By 
complicating the process to buy and sell weapons, brokers introduce alibis that 
make it easier for all parties involved to deny involvement. 
A broker’s principal task at the outset of an arms deal is matching the 
buyers demand with the supply of the most appropriate arms firm or 
manufacturer.  This will lead to a process of negotiating between buyer and seller 
to reach an agreed upon price that in legitimate arms deals will cover 
manufactures’ cost and profit in addition to transportation or shipping charges 
and insurance.  Illicit arms deals and transportation to prohibited recipients 
involve a much more “complex commercial chain that adds ‘service’ charges at 
each stage.”132  The addition of service charges will be dependent upon the 
source of the arms and the potential for complications of delivery to the 
prohibited customer.  If the weapons originate from a state-controlled stockpile, 
such as the liquidation of post-Cold War surplus from Eastern European and 
post-Soviet states, then there are generally additional charges required to “free 
them up.”133  Other costs will be added if the sale and delivery of weapons 
require the establishment of cut-outs, front-men, or subcontractors to create a 
complex intermediation process that is intended to disguise the ultimate recipient.  
Another consideration are the potential payoffs that will be required to obtain 
fraudulent paperwork from the country of origin or to support corrupt practices of 
customs, police, or military officials at either ports of transit or entry.134 
The brokers role in facilitating an arms deal is far from over once the 
parties involved have agreed on a price.  In order to cover up their trail and 
secure future business from unscrupulous clients, arms brokers will go to 
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considerable lengths to “establish intricate international webs involving multiple 
subcontractors, front companies, and circuitous transport routes.”135  These 
efforts are made to complicate the enforcement of brokers who leverage the 
inconsistent national prohibitions on trafficking in an effort to seek regulatory safe 
havens from which to conduct ‘third-country’ brokerage.136  Such practices can 
bypass the strict export or transit controls of one country by involving the lax 
standards of another.  Despite efforts to evade regulations and restrictions on 
arms trafficking there is a sequence of events and documentation that is routinely 
followed for both legitimate and illicit transactions that can serve to develop a 
model for the small arms supply chain. 
a. Documenting the Sale: Invoices 
The final purchase price for weapons is determined either through 
negotiations with a broker or through a mediation process where the broker 
arranges for buyer and seller to meet and make their own arrangements.  
Regardless of method, this process will conclude with an invoice that documents 
basic information about the sale to include a description of the commodity and 
the purchase price.  An illicit arms deal will rarely involve only one invoice 
throughout the full duration of the deal.  At a minimum, there is typically one 
public invoice that specifies the cost of supply, manufacture, profit, 
transportation, and insurance.137  These costs are typically found on a pro forma 
invoice which is used to obtain the additional required licenses and 
documentation without identifying the specific accounting information necessary 
to complete the transaction.  This information will be included on a subsequent 
commercial invoice which is generated after licenses have been obtained and the 
delivery process initiated.  In addition to these “public” invoices, a second  
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artificially inflated invoice is often used to cover the aforementioned service 
charges which can include corruption payments or the cost of  
fraudulently produced documentation.138 
b. Financing the Arms Deal 
There are a variety of mechanisms used to compensate suppliers 
or the supplying states of arms for international deals.  Payments can be 
categorized as political, commercial or financial.139  A political payment can be 
made by exchanging arms for favors or concessions granted by the recipient 
country.  While private businesses are still involved with brokering and 
transportation functions, they are likely to be compensated by the supplier state’s 
government and not directly from the buyer.  Commercial payments can be made 
in the form of counter-trade deals that are designed to benefit the recipient 
countries gross domestic product by arranging for the sale of its own goods and 
services.  While there are specific cases of commercial arrangements for arms 
deals the most common form of payment is financial arrangements that involve 
bank transfers through letters of credit.140 
The documentary letter of credit is the traditional trade tool of global 
supply chain finance.141  A letter of credit is extended between the buyer’s bank 
and the seller, or subsidiary of the seller, to document the buyer’s ability to fund a 
purchase.  The use of this instrument has been on the decline in most trade 
relationships because of their high administrative costs and manual processes 
involved.  In fact, the World Trade Organization estimates that over 80 per cent 
of global trade is now conducted in the form of open accounts, “whereby a 
supplier simply invoices his customer who then settles the invoice after a period 
of trade credit.”142  The exception for this growing trend in supply chain finance is 
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evident in fledgling relationships between new buyers and suppliers and markets 
involving illicit or prohibited trade as in many arms deals.  Buyers and sellers 
involved in illicit transactions have little course for holding parties accountable for 
goods not received or misrepresented.  The traditional process involving a letter 
of credit provides the buyer with a higher degree of confidence in the deals 
legitimacy since the letter of credit is not cashed until an air waybill and cargo 
manifest have been generated to account for the goods.  In his article titled, 
“Gunsmoke and Mirrors: Financing the Illegal Trade,” R.T. Taylor summarizes 
the arms purchase process up to this point: 
[T]he seller provides the potential purchaser with a quote. The 
buyer must then satisfy himself about the reliability of both product 
and seller. If satisfied, the buyer has his bank telex the seller’s 
bank, stating that the buyer’s bank is willing and able to open a 
letter of credit for a certain sum, provided certain conditions are 
met. Preliminary agreement made, the buyer’s bank sends an 
irrevocable LC to the seller’s bank. The LC will specify such things 
as delivery date, the date of manufacture of the material being 
supplied, the price of the merchandise, and the currency in which 
payment is being made . . . . The seller’s bank will cash the LC 
once certain documents are presented attesting to the existence 
and condition of the cargo, and its readiness for shipment.143 
As this passage illustrates, a letter of credit is not paid until other 
documents are presented along with it.  This includes “certificates of origin and of 
quality, cargo manifests, insurance policies,” and the air waybill.144  These 
documents are primarily required to attest to the validity of an order that a buyers 
bank is about to extend credit for.  Once the buyer’s bank is satisfied that the 
goods are properly represented, the letter of credit is cashed and subsequently 
initiates an inter-bank transfer of funds between the buyer and seller’s bank.  
Additional security is provided through insurance policies which are often 
stipulated by the letter of credit for the transported freight.  Insurance protects the 
buyer’s financial interests while the cargo is exposed to the risk of transport.  
Insurance requires a bill of lading, or airway bill, “which states the liability 
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assumed by the carrier.”145  These documents will be further discussed in 
Section 3 of this chapter which describes the role of freight forwarders and 
transportation agents.  
A successful grey market arms broker will develop a complex 
financial path between buyer and seller.  This often involves using numerous 
banks in both the originating and receiving country in addition to possible third-
country banks used to provide cover and concealment for fund transfers.146  
These banking institutions coordinate the necessary financial documents 
between buyers and sellers and ensure compliance of all letter of credit terms 
and conditions required prior to exporting arms.147  Financing an arms deal, 
much like the brokerage and transportation functions, is not a linear process.  
While the pro forma invoice might be the first document produced, other 
documents can be applied for or generated simultaneously.  While the broker is 
working with banks to generate the letter of credit, he is also working with 
government officials to initiate the required licenses to export the arms from the 
country of origin. 
c. End-User and Export Documentation 
As an internationally controlled commodity, small arms and light 
weapons are subject to specific licensing requirements that govern both sale and 
transfer.  These controlled commodities are classified by a system developed by 
the UN Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.  Each 
category of controlled goods is given a specific identification code designated by 
this UN committee.  The regulations for the transport of controlled and dangerous 
commodities and the associated classification system serve a variety of 
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purposes.148  These range from considerations for safety of flight when 
transporting dangerous goods aboard aircraft to the monitoring and restriction of 
transporting specific items to embargoed nations.  To monitor for violations of 
these regulations, a series of licenses are required by both countries of 
origination and destination of weapons which starts with a verification of the 
intended recipient.   
Most cases of illicit trafficking start with the identification of a 
legitimate end-user and end with a diversion of cargo to a prohibited recipient.  A 
general principle behind the efficacy of export control, therefore, lies in the 
process to verify the final destination and intended use, especially in the case of 
small arms.  Before an export license is granted by the country representing the 
weapon supplier, an end-user certificate must be granted which provides both 
the identity and associated country of the arms recipient and the intended use for 
the arms.  The end-user certification process is designed to facilitate the approval 
of export to legitimate buyers but is not by itself sufficient to prevent diversion.  
The United States requires that an end-user certificate be submitted with the 
request for authorization to export.  Along with the quantity and description of the 
exported commodity the U.S. end-user certificate, titled: Nontransfer and Use 
Certificate, lists the name of foreign end-user, country of ultimate destination, and 
certification by the recipient government that the shipment will not be re-exported 
or otherwise disposed without prior approval.149 
The process to grant end-user certificates varies from country to 
country and there are no common international standards to suggest basic 
requirements such as the mandatory content.  Illicit arms deals are often initiated 
by brokers who prepare fake end-user certificates or enlist the help of corrupt 
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national authorities to prepare legitimate certificates for a shipment that will 
ultimately be delivered to a third party.150  The cost of either fraudulently 
produced documents or corruption payments made to government officials is 
added to the secondary invoice, and hidden from public scrutiny by bank secrecy 
laws.151  In an investigation of arms trafficking to the embargoed nation of 
Liberia, a UN panel of experts discovered a list provided by a broker that outlined 
the availability and prices of specific weapons and ammunition.  The price of a 
fraudulent end-user certificate was listed as 50,000 U.S. dollars with a disclaimer 
that stipulated “24 hours required to obtain end-user.”152  
In an interview regarding the Viktor Bout arms trafficking network, 
Douglas Farah characterizes grey market arms deals by the use of fraudulent 
end-user certificates to facilitate diversion of arms shipments from a legitimate 
recipient to one sanctioned by a regional or international organization.  Farah 
claims that arms exports approved for shipment to a legitimate recipient are often 
carried out with knowledge that they are destined for a prohibited buyer.  An 
example of the grey market is “where one may know the weapons are destined 
for Liberia, but the [end-user certificate] says it is for Rwanda, and the Bulgarian 
company selling the weapons, while knowing the [end-user certificate] is likely a 
forgery, proceeds with the sale anyway.”153  Black market arms sales, 
conversely, are conducted in a manner that is clearly illegal and punishable. 
d. Import and Transit Documentation 
At the same time that the intermediaries of the small arms supply 
chain are working to obtain end-user certificates and export authority, they are 
coordinating with countries along the route of delivery and the destination country 
for shipping authorizations.  The Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
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Europe (OSCE) requires that participating states receive “the appropriate import 
license or some other form of official authorization” prior to permitting a shipment 
in order “to retain adequate control over such transfers and to prevent the 
diversion of the small arms to any party other than the declared recipient.”154  
The OSCE also requires that transit licenses are obtained from states involved in 
the trans-shipment by the responsible parties within the exporting state.155   
The import and transit licenses that are required along with the end-
user certificate to obtain export authorization are granted by national level 
authorities in each of the responsible nations.  The weapons supplier or trading 
firm, arms broker, freight forwarder, or transportation agent can all be involved in 
obtaining these documents.  In the United States, the State Department is 
responsible for the approval of export licenses for conventional arms sales.  U.S. 
Code governing arms exports requires end-user certification and import licenses 
are obtained prior to issuing an export license to the supplier thus monitoring 
each transaction.156  An alternative approach to export control is the granting of 
“open licenses” which permit specific individuals and companies to export a 
designated commodity to specific destinations or end-users.157  Nations like 
Slovakia have combined the two methods of regulation into a two-staged 
licensing procedure “in which the government grants a license authorizing 
companies or individuals to trade in weapons and also issues individual permits 
for each transaction.”158   
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While there is no clear division of labor in the complex regulatory 
environment of international arms trade, the processes described thus far are 
most often coordinated by brokers.  For conceptualizing the global small arms 
supply chain this division will be used as a point of departure to discuss the 
process outputs of the freight forwarders and transportation agents that are 
responsible for arranging the final delivery of weapons.  The bureaucratic 
wrangling that involves authorization of exporting small arms will continue as 
these actors must coordinate the physical delivery of weapons by sourcing 
aircraft, assuming responsibility of the cargo, and obtaining authorization for 
departure, transit, and landing in the destination country.  
3. Freight Forwarders and Transportation Agents 
While some of the most notorious and successful arms brokers have 
established a combined enterprise of brokerage and transportation capabilities, 
many rely on the expertise of freight forwarders and transportation agents to 
arrange for the delivery of goods between buyer and seller.  The freight 
forwarder, also known as a consolidator, is an intermediary that functions 
between an arms trading firm or their representative brokers and the 
transportation agents that will ultimately arrange deliver of the weapons.  This 
agent can be involved in the initial arms deal by providing a dollar estimate on 
the cost of transportation which includes freight costs, port charges, consular 
fees, required documentation, and insurance.  The freight forwarder can then 
make the actual arrangements for shipping which includes: “booking space with 
the carrier; completing export documentation; arranging for cargo insurance; 
advising on foreign import regulations; providing guidance on packaging, 
marking, and labeling; arranging for products to be packed and containerized at 
the exporter’s request; and export clearance.”159 
The domain of transportation agents includes “all actors responsible for 
the organization and management of a network of individuals and companies” 
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involved with the physical transportation of freight between supplier and buyer.160  
These individuals and their associated companies utilize trucks, ships, or aircraft 
that are owned, leased, or chartered by the agent for any particular shipment.161  
Deliveries can also be made by affiliated transporters that are further 
subcontracted by the transportation agent.  The process to physically transport 
arms “is usually the most vulnerable aspect of a clandestine or illegal arms 
transaction.”162  This is in part due to the transition from virtual processes 
executed through electronic document and fund transfers to the physical and 
more visible processes of loading, unloading, and trans-shipping cargo.  Before a 
consignment of arms departs the exporting country and thus enters this physical 
realm, freight forwarders or transportation agents are responsible for fulfilling 
specific documentary requirements stipulated by the countries of origin and 
destination and as required by financiers as a condition to cash the letter of 
credit. 
a. Air waybill and Cargo Manifests 
While some licenses and authorizations are obtained sequentially, 
the intermediaries of the arms supply chain will initiate the procurement of 
several documents concurrently.  The generally accepted revised Kyoto 
Convention on Customs stipulates that trans-shipment of military related cargo, 
to include small arms and light weapons, is only permissible following the receipt 
of an invoice, end-user certificate, export license, air waybill, and cargo 
manifest.163  While the principal arms broker will generally coordinate invoices 
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and licenses, the freight forwarders or transportation agents can produce the 
required air waybill and cargo manifest.   
The air waybill, arranged between the consignor164 and 
transportation agent, acts as the “official contract concerning transportation of 
cargo by air.”165  The consignor is most often identified on the air waybill as the 
supplying firm.  The consignee, however, is a contracting person or company 
who is listed on the air waybill as entitled to receive and assume responsibility of 
the shipment.166  Sometimes a distinction is made between an intermediary and 
the ultimate consignee whereupon the former is “an agent for a principal party in 
interest” and the later is the final end-user of the cargo.167 
The air waybill, also known as the consignment note, includes 
carrier conditions such as limits of liability and instructions for claims.  The 
contract also specifies “shipping instructions to airlines, a description of the 
commodity, and applicable transportation charges.”168  A related document that 
is used predominantly for maritime shipping is the bill of lading.  Amnesty 
International describes the function of the bill of lading as threefold: “a) it is a 
receipt for goods shipped on board; b) it is a document of title for these goods; 
and c) although not a contract, it is evidence of a previous contract.”169  As was 
the case with the letter of credit, the bill of lading or air waybill produced for an 
illicit arms deal “will normally misrepresent the nature of the cargo.”170   
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Another requirement for trans-shipment of goods, albeit cursory at 
best, is the cargo manifest.  This document will reference the air waybill number 
and provide basic information such as aircraft registration number and flight 
number; point of origin and destination of cargo; and the description and weight 
of goods carried.  A manifest often identifies an entire shipment of multiple 
containers under one description such as “general cargo.”  Related to the 
manifest is the General Declaration certificate “which specifies who was on board 
and where the flight originated and landed.”171  This document will not include 
details about the cargo carried on a particular flight.  Furthermore, the cargo 
manifest and air waybill do not require detailed descriptions of cargo and are 
typically not cross-referenced with the export or import license by customs 
inspectors or port authorities.172   
b. Customs and Port Authorities 
The arms supply chain will pass through several layers of customs 
and port authority officials represented in both the country of origination and 
destination in addition to the countries of transit.  This regulatory function is 
intended to ensure that the items declared on the air waybill and cargo manifest 
match the export and import licenses and ultimately correspond to the physical 
contents of the aircraft.  As previously described, however, this process is often 
cursory at best or presents a minimal level of regulation on transport agents 
because of the limited capacity for inspections that is characteristic of many 
destinations for illicit arms.   
The World Customs Organization (WCO) describes the major roles 
of customs inspectors to include the collection of “duties and taxes, the 
preparation of foreign trade statistics, trade compliance, supply chain security 
and facilitation, and the protection of society, the environment and cultural 
heritage.”173  A component of ensuring trade compliance is the verification of 
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export and import licenses that authorize the trans-shipment of controlled goods.  
The freight forwarders or transportation agents often coordinate directly with 
customs officials, although some deals can involve a customhouse broker who is 
“responsible for documentation and direct interface with customs and other 
government agencies.”174  As described by the WCO, customs inspectors are 
responsible for collecting import or export tariffs which introduce motives for 
financial gain.  As previously described, the financial details of illicit arms deals 
frequently includes corruption payments which will be made to these officials to 
“rubber stamp” the inspection process and allow the passage of illicit cargoes.  
The port authorities involved in the small arms supply chain 
described by this thesis are limited to the air traffic controllers located at airports.  
These authorities are responsible for the safety of operations into and out of their 
respective airports.  This includes de-conflicting aircraft that are landing and 
taking-off as well as monitoring the movement of aircraft on the ground and the 
operation of cargo trans-loading activity.175  In addition to these controllers, 
however, there are authorities responsible for de-conflicting aircraft in flight and 
outside of the terminal control provided during take-off and landing.  These 
controllers are located in a central Flight Information Center (FIC) and have 
responsibility for the airspace bounded by their respective Flight Information 
Region (FIR).  The airspace covering Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, is 
included within the Roberts FIR, named after Roberts International Airport in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone.  The FIC controllers for the Roberts FIR are located in 
Conakry, Guinea, and are responsible for all over-flights and ascending or 
descending aircraft above 3,000 feet.  Controllers transfer responsibility between 
FIC and local airport towers when crossing this threshold.176  In addition to  
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maintaining standards for safe flight practices, FIC and local tower air traffic 
controllers document aircraft flight activity for the purpose of charging  
over-flight or landing and take-off fees. 
Despite the complicated and seemingly well regulated process to 
monitor global supply chains, unscrupulous brokers, transportation agents, and 
aircraft operators have each devised techniques to facilitate the clandestine 
delivery of arms to prohibited buyers.  The final section will focus on the 
operators involved with the trans-shipment of arms and outline several 
techniques used by operators who are involved with illicit arms trafficking. 
4. Air Operators and Illicit Arms Flights 
The supply chain that funnels weapons from Eastern European and post-
Soviet states to African conflict zones can involve transportation by air, land, and 
sea.  Aircraft are often the preference to move high value and perishable cargoes 
onto and off of the African continent.  This is in part due to the vast distances that 
are linked by inadequate ground transportation infrastructure which further 
deteriorates during the rainy seasons.177  The United Nations has observed that 
the establishment of arms embargoes upon African states and non-state actors 
will drive traffickers to the skies because of the advantages that are offered by 
the scant regulatory capacity of African nations over their airspace.178  In fact, 
after years of investigating the flow of arms into Liberia, the United Nations 
declared that “[a]ir transportation is the preference of sanctions busters.”179 
This final section to this anatomy of an arms deal will introduce the air 
operators and the process by which they physically transport arms to buyers.  
There are a variety of business practices and aircraft ownership schemes within 
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the international air cargo industry that range from large commonly recognized 
airlines to the small “fly-by-night” operators that can further subcontract their 
services.  In addition to sourcing aircraft, the air operators are responsible for 
flight planning; obtaining departure, transit, and landing authorizations; and 
providing the flight crews who will ultimately fly the aircraft.  Individual airlines 
must have air operating certifications and their aircraft must have certification of 
airworthiness, registration, insurance, maintenance, and fuel.  Furthermore, the 
operators involved in the clandestine delivery of small arms to prohibited buyers 
have developed techniques to prevent detection of their illicit activity. 
a. Operators: Airlines, Integrators, and Charter Companies 
According to the 2005/2006 JP Airline Fleet data, there are over 
5,930 active aviation companies worldwide including over 600 main cargo 
airlines operating with either owned or leased aircraft under 204 separate 
aviation registries.180  There are dozens of other airlines whose business life is 
“too short or shadowy to be recorded.”181  These are the companies that are 
often involved in illicit or questionable arms transfers using vintage cargo aircraft 
such as former Soviet military Antonov AN-12s and AN-24s, Ilyushin IL-18s and 
IL-76s, and former Western passenger and cargo aircraft such as Boeing 707s, 
Douglas DC-8s, and Lockheed C-130s. 
The aircraft used in proliferation networks, just like aircraft involved 
in a variety of legitimate transportation roles, often have an obscure lineage that 
complicates the efforts to regulate and monitor their activity.  The operators of the 
cargo aircraft generally fall into one of three categories: major airlines, 
integrators, and small charter companies.182  The major airlines utilize aircraft 
that are configured for all-cargo, combined passenger and cargo or “combi”, and 
all-passenger which can still have substantial cargo space in the aircraft’s belly.  
Air cargo integrators provide “door-to-door” transportation to clients by combining 
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freight forwarding and airline functions within the supply chain.183  These 
operators are also known as express air companies and include companies such 
as Federal Express, DHL, and UPS.184  Most legitimate air freight, including the 
majority of legitimate arms transfers and contracted military air freight, is carried 
by major airlines and integrators.185 
The air operators that are most often implicated in illicit or 
questionable arms transfers are the smaller “and sometimes shadowy cargo 
companies” that offer charter services.186  These companies can provide an 
initial estimate for delivery, while working directly with the freight forwarder or 
arms broker.  They can arrange delivery of freight on aircraft they own or further 
subcontract or lease aircraft from other operators.187  Many of the aircraft 
involved in illicit smuggling operations are Cold-War vintage former military cargo 
aircraft that have long surpassed their useful service dates.  Unscrupulous 
operators keep these aircraft flying by supporting a network of maintenance 
facilities that stretch across the Middle East and Africa and by obtaining forged 
registration, operating licenses, and airworthiness certificates.188   
b. Aircraft Registration 
The vintage cargo aircraft that perform the heavy lifting for the 
global arms supply chain are often found based at “airports where economic or 
political factors have made the scrutiny of cargoes a rare event.”189  The airport 
authorities at these locations, which include Sharjah, UAE and Ostend, Belgium, 
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are often more concerned with attracting capitol investments then verifying the 
legitimacy of the air operators.  The aircraft are commonly registered under what 
amounts to an aviation equivalent of the maritime “flag of convenience.”  This 
term refers to a common practice of shipping operators who register their vessels 
in nations that offer the least amount of regulatory oversight and associated 
expense.  The vessel will then fly the flag of that particular country, from which is 
derived the term.  Countries that have become synonymous with the “flag of 
convenience” moniker include both Panama and Liberia.  Countries known as 
flags of convenience for aircraft operators are described by the United Nations as 
having open aviation registries.  These registries are sought out by illicit transport 
agents as they offer “poor oversight of aircraft and operator by the country where 
the aircraft is registered.”190  These attributes often result from the combined 
desire of specific countries to attract foreign investment and from their already 
limited monitoring capacity.  
Liberia has extended the benefits of registration from maritime 
vessels to aircraft through its use of lenient license and tax laws.  This is 
combined with the fact that Liberia’s aviation rules are already limited and poorly 
enforced which offers aircraft operators with discretion, operational cover, and 
minimal regulatory interference.  While investigating the connection between illicit 
registration practices for aircraft and the increased frequency of arms flights to 
West Africa, the United Nations discovered that in the year 2000 the government 
of Liberia only listed 7 aircraft on its official registry.  During this same 
investigation, however, at least 15 additional aircraft were documented with 
Liberian registration that did not appear on the official government record.191  
These aircraft were effectively operating unbeknownst to the Liberian 
government, suggesting that they were evading further registration expenses and 
periodic inspections for airworthiness.  Aircraft registration numbers and even the 
name of the airline leasing or operating the plane “can be readily switched to 
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conceal an operation.”192  Using a fictitious registration number or exchanging 
registration numbers between aircraft is difficult to monitor because of the 
inability of many African civil aviation authorities to exchange information.  The 
United Nations claims that tracing the origins of an aircraft carrying an unknown 
registration number is practically impossible.193   
c. Flight Planning 
In addition to documentary requirements for the air operators, each 
flight is subject to specific regulations in the countries of departure, transit, and 
arrival.  The air waybill and cargo manifest are generally produced well in 
advance of the associated flight as a required term for the seller to cash the letter 
of credit.  However, flight plans, airport landing permits, and over-flight 
permissions will be generated closer to the actual date of flight.  These functions 
can be performed by the air operator responsible for the aircraft or subcontracted 
out to a flight support service provider.  These agents are established to provide 
fuel, weather, and flight planning services to operators that are unfamiliar with the 
unique procedural requirements of foreign air travel or who operate on smaller 
scale and cannot fully accommodate this resource intensive process.  Flight 
support service providers can also obtain permits for landing and over-flight; 
security for crew, aircraft, and cargo while en route; and coordinate ground 
handling of cargo at the point of origin and destination.194   
The detailed flight plans generated by flight support service 
companies are made to ensure compliance with international safety of flight 
requirements and facilitate payment of appropriate charges for take-off and 
landings, over-flight, and use of any airport facilities while en route.  Of note, the 
“forms for requesting permission to fly over and subsequently land in certain 
countries do not require any detailed statements concerning the nature of the 
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cargo on board the aircraft.”195  The routes preferred for arms flights into Africa 
will involve a number of landings and refueling in locations that range from 
across Northern African and around the Mediterranean Sea to the Sudan, and 
are designed for the express purpose of further concealing the transfer.196  The 
flight support service providers operate under the veil of “client confidentiality” 
which often stymies international efforts to collect data on illicit flights.197 
d. Common Practices of Sanction Busting Flights 
The efforts made by unscrupulous air operators to disguise an illicit 
arms flight starts with registering aircraft under “flags of convenience”, or using 
outright false registration numbers, or further subcontracting operations to 
complicate tracking efforts.  In addition to these initial efforts to obfuscate an illicit 
arms shipment, air operators and pilots employ additional tactics to further 
increase their chance of arriving undetected.  These efforts assume that the 
aircraft crew is fully aware of the contents of the cargo and the prohibited nature 
of the recipient.   
Illicit small arms trafficking conducted by civil aircraft can be 
accomplished by one of two ways.  Either the operator of the aircraft and the 
associated flight crew are aware of the illicit cargo and will make every effort to 
conceal it from the authorities; or the cargo is hidden by association with a 
legitimate item and the flight crew is subsequently unaware of its presence.  
Small-scale smuggling operations often occur unbeknownst to the flight crew 
because the risk of detecting a small quantity of contraband is low and therefore 
the monetary loss to the smuggler, should the contraband be seized, is also low.  
Larger shipments, however, are often conducted with the full knowledge of the 
flight crew who will thus make every effort to avoid detection.   
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The most notorious cases of illicit arms flights to prohibited 
recipients in Africa involve large scale shipments of weapons and ammunition 
aboard commercially operated aircraft.  These shipment required flight-crew 
complicacy to handle a variety of forged documents that misrepresented the 
cargo, and to conduct surreptitious flight routes involving unannounced transit 
stops and concealed loading and offloading of cargo.  The rewards for the flight-
crew to take these risks are purely financial.  Journalist Brian Johnson-Thomas 
documented the case of arms embargo busting flights from Europe to Khartoum, 
Sudan, in the late-1990s in which each of the five-man crew of one cargo aircraft 
netted $5,000 for each of at least 20 flights.198  The risk to conducting the flights, 
conversely, was “either being imprisoned en route or, conceivably, back in 
Europe if the authorities should ever find out.”199 
False flight planning and unannounced stops are the most 
commonly documented method for delivering small arms to prohibited buyers.  
The United Nations has investigated multiple cases of sanction busting arms 
flights that involved the use of fraudulent end-user certificates that identified a 
legitimate buyer to gain approval for export.  A false flight plan is then generated 
that indicates this location as the ultimate destination for the delivery of goods.  
At some point en route, however, the aircraft diverts to another destination and 
because the airspace over Africa is largely uncontrolled, there is no means to 
determine the final destination of the aircraft after leaving Europe.200  This 
practice can be made to look legitimate by making an unscheduled or emergency 
landing along the way to the declared destination with the intent of offloading 
goods for delivery to a prohibited user.201  The UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC) has observed this technique used by pilots who 
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make unscheduled stops in Kisangani to offload weapons and load illegally 
procured natural minerals aboard their aircraft.202 
Another documented diversion technique is the practice of 
misreporting aircraft position while en route to the declared destination.  The 
management of aircraft transiting African FIRs is coordinated by controllers who 
receive position reports from pilots over VHF radio.  A position report is provided 
by a pilot operating outside of controlled airspace every hour.203  Since aircraft 
cannot be seen on radar, pilots conducting illicit flights can provide false position 
reports or no position reports while transiting airspace.  The intent of providing a 
false position report is to create the appearance of flying to a legitimate 
destination that is declared on the flight plan and corresponds to the export and 
import licenses.  While the aircraft appears to be on the declared course, it can 
land and offload cargo inside a prohibited country and subsequently return to the 
declared flight plan prior to raising any suspicions.  Aviation authorities in West 
Africa receive reports of violations by pilots and note that “aircraft operators can 
operate with impunity in their sphere of sovereignty, without their knowledge.”204 
In addition to surreptitious flight planning and the use of 
unscheduled stops and transmitting false position reports, transport agents and 
the operators of aircraft have devised additional methods of concealed delivery.  
Another technique involves the practice of sub-leasing the permissions for 
international over-flight to another airline or handling agency.  This allows an air 
carrier with a shady past to use the call sign of a carrier in good standing and 
thus reducing the suspicion of illicit activity and further disguising arms 
deliveries.205  Operators can also use corruption payments to win favors with 
customs and airport officials that monitor trans-shipment activity.  This technique 
was documented by the UN while investigating sanction busting arms flights into 
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Liberia.  While seeking an explanation as to why some flights had not been 
logged in the 2003 flight register206 the panel of experts found that “[w]hen 
aircraft carrying weapons are expected (generally, such flights arrive at night), 
the air traffic controllers, who are civilians, are replaced by military air traffic 
controllers.”207  The panel noted that specific flights are not logged in the register 
and subsequently do not file flight plans upon departure.  These efforts combine 
to conceal the delivery of embargoed goods and eliminate the paper trail that can 
be used for subsequent implication of wrong doing. 
The surreptitious operational techniques employed by arms smugglers 
can be summed up by the anecdotal information obtained by Brian Wood and 
Johan Peleman through conversations with pilots, loadmasters, and aviation 
inspectors described below: 
A cargo plane was named as flying in at an airport with one 
registration number and then flying out with a different one.  
Another airline was said to have changed its corporate structure 
and name overnight when its name became linked to illicit activities. 
One operator used an old license that had been cancelled by 
aviation authorities to fly several ‘ghost planes’ to hot spots in 
Africa. Another corporate owner used the logo and colours of a 
licensed company to fly non-licensed planes.208 
C. SUMMARY OF THE SMALL ARMS SUPPLY CHAIN 
In practice, there are no fixed boundaries between sellers, buyers, or 
intermediaries.  Additionally, there can be multiple brokers, banks, or transport 
agents involved within and outside of the country of origin and destination for the 
weapons.  Brokers and transport agents continue to refine their methods of 
delivery because of the substantial financial rewards that can be gained.  Brokers 
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manipulate inadequate licensing and end-user certificate systems209 and take 
advantage of secrecy laws that make it a criminal offence for bank officials to 
reveal information about clients.210  The transportation agents devise “[c]omplex 
corporate structures showing the registration of the aircraft, the insurance for the 
plane, insurance for the cargo, the operating agent of the aircraft and the owner 
of the aircraft all registered in different countries and sometimes represented by 
third parties.”211  Complicating the matter is the “shell game” that is often played 
by transport agents to create front companies to represent airlines.  These 
companies can then be used to shuffle registration numbers, airline names and 
liveries, and call-signs for aircraft that appear to be subcontracted or leased but 
are still operating within the same corporate structure.   
The graphic representation of the small arms supply chain presented at 
the beginning of this chapter represents a theoretical process for conducting an 
arms deal.  The process starts with the coordination between buyers and sellers 
through a broker who can either mediate or negotiate a sale.  The broker, which 
can be represented by one or more individuals or brokerage companies, 
coordinates directly with national level government authorities in the export, 
import, and transit countries to obtain these licenses.  At the same time that 
brokers are working on obtain legitimate licenses, or create fraudulent versions, 
the arms buyer’s bank is extending a letter of credit to the supplier.  Like other 
actors represented by this flowchart, there can be a number of banks and 
fiduciaries involved with this process.  The arrangements for transportation can 
be made between broker and freight forwarder or directly between broker and 
transportation agent.  Before the letter of credit is cashed, the freight forwarder or 
transportation agent must obtain insurance coverage for the cargo and produce 
the air waybill, cargo manifest, and flight plan.  With these outputs performed, 
and the letter of credit cashed, the final authorization for flight will initiate the last  
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step in the process.  The weapons are now loaded aboard an aircraft, inspected 
by customs officials, and approved for departure by local airport air traffic 
controllers. 
In Chapter IV, an analysis of Liberian arms trafficking networks will 
demonstrate the fluidity in function of each of these actors.  The problem with 
clearly defining the specific roles and responsibilities of individual actors involved 
in the arms trade has left the door open for exploiting national and international 
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IV. MAPPING THE PROLIFERATION NETWORKS OF LIBERIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The anatomy of an arms deal described in Chapter III provides the context 
for further analysis of proliferation networks.  Proliferation and criminal networks 
thrive in the failed nation-states of West Africa where tribal warlords “control both 
natural resources and sometimes the organs of state power, such as national 
banks, commerce, and foreign relations.”212  In their work on illegal networks, or 
in their terms: dark networks, Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward suggest 
reformulating the problem of illegal activity into network terms to better inform 
policy recommendations designed to disrupt and destroy them.213  Dark networks 
support a variety of illegal activity in West Africa, including natural resource 
exploitation, small arms proliferation, and terrorist financing.  This chapter will 
focus on the West African nation of Liberia and multiple cases of illicit arms 
trafficking events that occurred over the course of the second civil war.  To frame 
these cases in network terms, a brief discussion of basic network properties and 
social network analysis will be included.  First, however, is a background on the 
violence in Liberia and the history of United Nations sanctions designed to 
prevent it. 
1. Liberia’s Culture of Violence 
Over the course of the last two decades, Liberia has suffered a complete 
breakdown of law and order during two distinct civil wars that have claimed the 
lives of almost 150,000 people and resulted in the external displacement of close 
to 1 million more.214  The first phase of violence began in 1989 as the opposition 
group, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), clashed with government 
forces.  As violence between these groups intensified, the United Nations reacted 
with an arms embargo in 1992 that was intended to restrict the flow of both 
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weapons and ammunition that proved instrumental to the level of violence.  By 
1993, the United Nations would establish its Observer Mission in Liberia 
(UNOMIL) which acted to assist the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to broker peace.  An agreement 
was reached in 1993 in Cotonou, Benin, which was delayed in implementation 
because of continued fighting among multiple factions and would eventually lead 
to the election of the NPFL leader, Charles Taylor, in July 1997.215 
While hostilities had largely dissipated and with the original mandate 
completed, UNOMIL withdrew from Liberia in September 1997 followed by 
ECOMOG in November 1999.216  The United Nations established a Peace-
building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) with the responsibility to initiate 
national reconciliation programs designed to reconstruct the failed state.  
However, a political stalemate would follow as both government and opposition 
party leaders were unable to resolve their key differences which led to the 
emergence in 1999 and 2002, respectively, of the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL).217  Both rebel groups vowed to overthrow President Taylor’s 
government through violent armed conflict and won control of nearly two thirds of 
the country by May, 2003.  By June of that year, the efforts of the international 
community culminated in peace negotiations between all concerned Liberian 
parties in Accra, Ghana.  In September, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted resolution 1509 (2003) which established the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL).218  UNMIL initially consisted of 15,000 peacekeepers and was 
described as “a multidimensional operation composed of political, military, civilian 
police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, 
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disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, public information and support 
components, as well as an electoral component.”219   
2. Current Arms Embargo on Liberia 
Resolution 1509 (2003) recognized the culture of violence that had been 
inculcated in Liberian government forces, rebel groups, and civilians alike, and 
intended to act on recommendations by ECOWAS to focus on curbing the 
proliferation of small arms and reviewing the current regime of sanctions against 
Liberia.220  By December 2003, the Security Council adopted a revised arms 
embargo against Liberia which declared:  
that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the 
sale or supply to Liberia, by their nationals or from their territories or 
using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related material of 
all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the 
aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories.221 
This embargo was last renewed in December 2006 for a period of 12 
months and will be further extended or modified by the end of 2007.222  
Additionally, the mandate of UNMIL has been extended through at least 
September 2008.  The fifteenth and latest United Nations progress report on 
UNMIL stated that the Government of Liberia “continued to implement its agenda 
for peace consolidation, governance reform and economic recovery.”223  The 
same report, however, identifies that there is still risk of renewed violence posed 
by the possible resurgence of armed groups, especially those who remain loyal 
to former President Charles Taylor.224 
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During Taylor’s Presidency, Liberia became the nexus of many dark 
networks.225  The remainder of this chapter will illustrate the arms proliferation 
network by focusing on 4 interrelated events.  These events will be further 
described using the network terms further described below. 
B. NETWORK FUNDAMENTALS 
As suggested by Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, complex problems 
are increasingly being reformulated in network terms to better inform policy.  In 
one of the first studies on the application of network analysis to criminal activity, 
Malcolm Sparrow claimed that despite an obvious awareness of the importance 
of intelligence analysis to understanding complex criminal networks, the 
responsible agencies “have remained for the most part relatively unsophisticated 
in their use of analytic tools and concepts.”226  Recently, however, these analytic 
tools and concepts are being used to identify and isolate key individuals and 
organizations incorporated within both criminal and terrorist networks.  For 
example, Stuart Koschade employed social network analysis as a conceptual 
framework to deconstruct the structure of the Indonesian-based Jemaah 
Islamiyah terrorist organization.  Among his analytical findings, Koschade is able 
to measure “the level of each cell member’s activity, ability to access others, and 
the control over the flow of information within networks,” thus identifying the most 
important individuals involved with the 2002 Bali bombing.227 
1. Social Network Analysis 
The same social network methodology that Koschade used to describe 
the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization can be applied to proliferation 
networks.  A social network is generally defined as the representation of relations 
that exist between a finite set of individual actors.228  Social network analysis 
(SNA), therefore, is the methodological approach that can identify key actors in a 
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network through the analysis of the relations between actors.  Social network 
analysis is a distinct research perspective that has flourished within the social 
and behavioral sciences.  It is “distinct because social network analysis is based 
on an assumption of the importance of relationships among interacting units.”229  
This emphasis on relations forms the basis for network theory that not only 
defines the actors in a network but seeks to explain how actors are connected to 
one another.   
a. Actors 
The main goal of social network analysis can be described as 
“detecting and interpreting patterns of social ties among actors.”230  The actor 
within social network analysis is a social entity that can be a “discrete individual, 
corporate, or collective social” unit.231  In proliferation networks, actors include 
buyers and sellers, brokers, insurance and financial agents, government 
licensing and export officials, and transportation agents and aircraft operators 
among many others.  These actors and their actions are interdependent of one 
another within the context of the proliferation process.232  The contextual 
chapters of this thesis were intended to identify the principal actors of 
proliferation networks and provide a preview of the relationships that exist 
between them by constructing a graphic representation of the small arms supply 
chain. 
b. Ties 
Found between the actors of a social network are relational ties that 
link specific actors with one another.  The defining feature of this tie is the 
relation that “establishes a linkage between a pair of actors.”233  In social 
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networks, this tie between actors is often formed through friendship, kinship, or 
common association such as school or church attendance.  The linkage can also 
be formed through participation or affiliation with a distinct event.  These 
relational ties are central to social network analysis as they represent channels 
for transfer or “flow” of material or nonmaterial resources between actors.  This 
linkage will become central to establishing affiliation networks of actors involved 
within specific arms trafficking events described later in this chapter. 
c. Groups 
Social network analysis requires the collection of data on a set of 
actors and the relational ties that exist between them.  Social network data 
“consist of at least one structural variable measured on a set of actors.”234  The 
intent of the network analyst will determine the variables to measure and will 
result in a group, or “the collection of all actors on which ties are to be 
measured.”235  This group can be distilled into individual subgroups, or “any 
subset of actors, and all ties among them,” based on specific attributes or 
affiliations.  Subgroups are also referred to as cliques, which can be defined as 
“a subset of a network in which the actors are more closely and intensely tied to 
one another than they are to other members of the network.”236 
2. Visualizing Social Network Data 
The two principle methods to visualize social network data are in graphs 
and matrices.  A graph is “a model for a social network with an undirected 
dichotomous relation; that is, a tie is either present or absent between each pair 
of actors.”237  Simply speaking, a graph “consists of points (or nodes) to 
represent actors and lines (or edges) to represent ties or relations.”238  The term 
coined by sociologists to describe these graphs is a sociogram, which will be 
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used to describe the graphic representation of proliferation networks.  Matrices, 
in contrast, used to collect data on the relations between actors depicted in a 
structure of rows and columns.  Matrices and the data structure for proliferation 
events will be described in more detail throughout this chapter.  Listed below are 
a few final concepts that will be used to describe these networks and the 
relational ties that exist between actors.  
a. Levels of Measuring Relations 
The ties between actors depicted on a graph can either be binary, 
signed, or valued.  At the most basic level, binary relations describe only whether 
a tie exists or not.239  A binary relation can be depicted on a matrix by entering a 
one at the intersection of column and row between actors that have an identified 
relationship and with a zero for actors who do not.  Representing preferences 
between actors that have a relationship, such as like or dislike, can be 
accomplished with signed data.  Signed data can be displayed on a graph by 
assigning “a + to indicate ‘liking,’ zero to indicate ‘don’t care’ and – to indicate a 
negative choice.”240  Finally, a valued relation between actors can be measured 
by rank ordering a constant variable that exists such as who each actor likes the 
“most, next most, and least.”241  The approach taken to represent relationships 
between actors of proliferation networks will be to find common participation 
within organizations or with specific trafficking events.  For this reason, only 
binary relations will be used between actors to represent the presence or 
absence of a tie. 
b. Directed Ties 
Just as relations between actors can be measured to accommodate 
various discriminators, they can also represent a directional tie that exists 
between actors.  Directed or “bonded” ties are often used in advice or trust 
networks that display whom each actor goes to for advice or who they trust.  
Since advice and trust are not necessarily reciprocal, they are considered to be 
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directed ties and are displayed on a graph with arrow heads “indicating who is 
directing the tie toward whom.”242  Much like the decision to use only binary 
values to represent relations between actors of proliferation networks, the 
available data for each case study does not support the use of directed ties. 
c. Simplex and Multiplex Relations 
One of the inherent values of using social network analysis to 
describe complex illegal, or dark networks, is the ability to represent multiple 
relations between individual actors.  Simplex relations “represent a single type of 
relation among actors” while multiplex relations display “more than one kind of 
relation.”243  The ability to graph multiplex relations will become instrumental in 
the discussion of proliferation networks that exhibit commonality between 
organizations involved in discrete trafficking events.  For example, a freight 
forwarder that was established and subsequently coordinated logistics for 
multiple events will have multiplex relations between actors associated with that 
organization through association with each of the events. 
d. Matrices 
With very large networks, either containing a large number of actors 
or depicting many kinds of relations, graphs can become cluttered to the point 
that patterns are not easily discernable.  In this case, matrices can be used to 
input social data into mathematical and computer tools that perform analytical 
functions.  A matrix “is nothing more than a rectangular arrangement of a set of 
elements…described by the number of rows of elements and columns of 
elements that they contain.”244  The simplest matrix is binary and represents a tie 
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  Bob Carol Ted Alice 
Bob -- 1 1 0 
Carol 0 -- 1 0 
Ted 1 1 -- 1 
Alice  0 0 1 -- 
Table 2.   Example of an Asymmetric Adjacency Matrix245 
 
A matrix such as this represents the starting point for most network 
analysis, and “is called an ‘adjacency matrix’ because it represents who is next to 
whom in the ‘social space’.”246  The example provided in Table 2 depicts directed 
ties, the source of which is listed in the rows with the targets found in the 
columns.  This matrix is, therefore, asymmetric as Bob chooses Carol, but Carol 
does not choose Bob.247 
The terminology and principals presented thus far will be further 
elucidated in this chapter; they will form the basis for the subsequent analysis of 
weapons proliferation networks and their behavior as social networks.  Using this 
construct will provide a point of departure to assess the current structure for 
regulating arms proliferation and provide the context for recommendations to 
stem the flow of small arms to the world’s conflict zones. 
3. Suitability of Liberian Case-Study 
The second Liberian civil war that was waged from 1999 to 2003 between 
the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and both LURD and MODEL rebel groups has 
several attributes that makes it appropriate for this particular course of study.  
The time frame for violence follows the post-Cold War liquidation of small arms 
and surplus military equipment described in previous chapters.  The United 
Nations reacted to the atrocities of the first civil war through the imposition of an 
arms embargo which lasted through the second phase of violence and is still in 
effect today.  The combined effect of a global supply-side weapons market and 
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the implementation of an internationally recognized arms embargo resulted in 
enterprising arms brokers capitalizing on the available resource wealth by 
adopting creative methods to clandestinely transport and deliver small arms. 
Using social network analysis to describe proliferation networks can serve 
many purposes.  Social scientists study the human aspects of the world and 
argue that “society is not an aggregate of individuals and their characteristics, as 
statisticians assume, but a structure of interpersonal ties.”248  The unit of analysis 
for social sciences is not, therefore, an individual alone, but rather that individual 
and the surrounding social, economic, or cultural ties.  Viewed through this lens, 
proliferation networks are not merely a collection of discrete actors but rather a 
unique structure of relationships that exist between actors and function in concert 
to deliver illicit cargoes to prohibited regimes.  
Two distinct outputs of social network analysis is the ability to visualize 
network data and the ability to run calculations or measurements of the 
quantifiable structural features of networks.  This thesis does not propose to test 
any particular hypothesis on proliferation networks but rather to describe the 
small arms supply chain and subsequent efforts for regulation in network terms.  
The application of social network analysis in the case study on Liberia should 
reveal features that are already commonly accepted.  This approach has been 
described as exploratory social network analysis which “assumes that the 
structure or pattern of ties in a social network is meaningful to members of the 
network and, hence, to the researcher.”249  
C. LIBERIAN CASE STUDIES: SANCTION BUSTING EVENTS 
The case studies described below represent four separate arms trafficking 
events that have been documented by various United Nations Panels of Experts 
charged with investigating arms embargo violations.  For the most part, each 
case study involves separate arms brokers and transportation agents.  However, 
there are common actors that in the end will tie each of the discrete arms 
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trafficking events into an extensive network designed for the express purpose of 
clandestine arms delivery to prohibited buyers.  Each of these events occurred 
during the second Liberian civil war that waged from 1999 to 2003 between the 
AFL and both LURD and MODEL rebel forces. 
1. Event 1: Leonid Minin’s 68-ton Arms Shipment 
A PBS Frontline investigation of international arms dealers describes the 
arrest of renowned trafficker Leonid Minin as a scene out of a Quentin Tarantino 
film: 
Minin, a pale Ukrainian, abundantly fleshy and naked, freebasing 
cocaine, flanked by a quartet of Russian, Albanian, Italian and 
Kenyan prostitutes. A pornographic film flickers in the background, 
Minin, the majority owner of the Europa Hotel in Cinisello Balsamo, 
a small town outside Milan, Italy, has transformed his two-room 
suite into a bedroom/office and den of debauchery.250 
The arrest of Minin in Italy resulted in the seizure of $500,000 worth of 
uncut diamonds, $35,000 of American, Italian, Hungarian, and Mauritian 
currency, and most importantly, 1,500 documents that detailed a wide variety of 
business operations.251  Among these operations were multiple weapons deals 
that were brokered by Minin and shipped into the embargoed nation of Liberia.  
The weapons imported into Liberia by Minin, who was a business partner and 
confidant of Liberian President Charles Taylor, ended up in the hands of AFL 
government troops, both LURD and MODEL rebel forces, and resulted in further 
proliferation across the border into Sierra Leone to support the rebel 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).252   
One of the weapons deals uncovered by the Milan customs police was a 
March 13, 1999, shipment of 68 tons of arms that included “3,000 AKM assault 
rifles, 1 million rounds of ammunition, 25 RPG-7s and related ordnance, Strela-3 
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and Metis systems and 80 related missiles.”253  The deal was initiated between 
the Ukrainian state-owned arms marketing company, Ukrspetsexport, and 
Minin’s front company, Chartered Engineering & Technical Company Ltd.254  The 
deal was authorized on the basis of an end-user certificate provided by Minin to 
the supplier which identified the Burkina Faso Ministry of Defense as the ultimate 
consignee.  The end-user certificate was signed by Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert 
Diendéré, head of the Presidential Guard of Burkina Faso.255 
This case of illicit trafficking represents a diversion of arms that initially 
appeared to be destined for Burkina Faso.  The first leg of the delivery was 
accomplished by an Antonov An-124 operated by the British company, Air Foyle, 
who was acting as an agent for Ukrainian air carrier, Antonov Design Bureau.256  
Upon arrival in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, the consignment was trucked to 
Bobo Dioulasso, and then carried aboard multiple flights to Liberia aboard Minin’s 
personal BAC-111.  Minin’s aircraft was registered in the Cayman Islands and 
operated by a company registered in Monaco named LIMAD.  A total of three 
flights were required to transport the weapons, and eye-witness accounts 
reported the involvement of another aircraft operated by the Liberian-based 
company Weasua.257 
Several intermediaries were involved in this initial consignment of 
weapons trans-shipped from Burkina Faso to Liberia.  A Lebanese business man 
named Talal El-Ndine, who was a part of Liberian President Charles Taylor’s 
inner-circle, negotiated the deal with Minin and provided payment for the arms.258  
Additional logistic support was provided by Dutch national Gus Van 
Kouwenhoven, who among other services, provided lodging for brokers, pilots, 
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and crew while in Liberia at his Hotel Africa in Monrovia.259  Van Kouwenhoven 
was also part of Taylor’s inner-circle through his contact with the former Liberian 
finance minister Emmanuel Shaw.260 
2. Event 2: Minin’s Second Consignment of Weapons 
Another widely documented case of violating the Liberian arms embargo 
was Leonid Minin’s follow-on delivery to the 68 tons of weapons described in 
Event 1.  This case began with a sizeable, albeit legal, order for military hardware 
and ammunition from the Ivorian head of state, General Robert Gueϊ in July, 
2000.  The now disposed ruler placed the million dollar order of Kalashnikov 
rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, night-vision goggles, and five million rounds of 
ammunition directly to Minin.261  Although Minin coordinated directly with Gueϊ, 
he subcontracted out to the brokerage services of Finnish-national Erkki 
Tammivuori and his Turkish company MET A.S. to make the final arrangements 
for a diversion to Liberia.  Tammivuori worked directly with the Liberian 
president’s son, Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr.262 
Like the illicit delivery described in Event 1, this case involved a diversion 
of arms from an approved buyer.  The deal consisted of 113 tons of arms 
brokered through the Ukrainian state-owned company, Spetstehnoexport.263  
The export of arms, which included 10,500 AK-47s, was approved by the Ukraine 
using an end-user certificate signed by General Gueϊ on May 26, 2000.  Gueϊ, 
who had a genuine interest in bolstering his own military forces to remain in 
power, struck a deal with the Liberian emissary to his country, Mohamed Salamé.  
Minin would later claim that “the deal had been organized by Mohamed Salamé 
on behalf of the Liberian President” and would include expanded concessions for 
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Minin’s timber business in Liberia.264  The Ivorian ambassador in Moscow 
provided the required authentication of the end-user certificate and a Ukrainian 
military officer traveled with the cargo under the auspice of verifying the 
delivery.265 
The weapons were delivered to Abidjan, Ivory Coast, from Gostomel on 
July, 15, 2000 following a fuel stop in Libya.266  The aircraft used was the same 
Antononv An-124 that delivered the 68 tons of arms to Burkina Faso in 1999, 
however, this time it was chartered by the Moscow-based company, 
Aviatrend.267  A representative of Aviatrend, Valery Cherny, chartered the aircraft 
from the Antonov Design Bureau. The financial aspects of this deal involve a mix 
of business concessions and cash payments.  Bank transfers indicated that Minin 
paid $1 million to Aviatrend using the Alpha Bank in Nicosia, Cyprus, and Chase 
Manhattan Bank in New York.  These payments were transferred by one of 
Minin’s many offshore holding companies, Sulico Holdings, and would be 
referred to in the documentation as for the purpose of “Buying Technical 
Material/Wood Extraction Tools.”268   
While some of the arms delivered to Abidjan may have stayed in the 
country, the vast majority would continue on their journey to Liberia.  Instrumental 
in this segment of the supply chain was Kenyan national Sanjivan Ruprah.  
Ruprah, a close associate of Viktor Bout and the Liberian Deputy Commissioner 
of Maritime Affairs, has been linked to several cases of arms embargo violations 
and is perhaps most well known for his role in the Liberian aviation registry 
during which time he accepted corruption payments in exchange for issuing 
certificates of registration on aircraft involved in illicit activity.269  Ruprah’s 
involvement in the delivery of Ukrainian arms involves the establishment of the 
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“ghost airline” West Africa Air Services to complete transportation from Abidjan to 
Monrovia.  The operation of West Africa Air Services was run through San Air in 
the United Arab Emirates.  The airline leased a single Ilyushin IL-18 from the 
Renan air cargo company of Moldova.  The leasing contract between West Africa 
Air Services and Renan was signed by Ruprah and LeRoy Urey, the brother of 
Benoni Urey who was the Liberian Commissioner of Maritime Affairs.270 
The leased Ilyushin IL-18 would make a total of 8 trips between Abidjan 
and Monrovia to complete the diversion.  The public record for West Africa Air 
Services reflects a total lifespan of the airline from 2000 to 2002.  The aircraft, 
which had been temporarily registered in Liberia as EL-ALY, was in the 
possession of West Africa Air Services from July to October, 2000, after which 
time it was transferred back to Renan and returned to the original Moldovan 
registration number of ER-ICJ.271  The United Nations panel of experts 
investigating this case discovered the fleeting nature of West Africa Air Services 
and the surreptitious flight activity of the Ilyushin-18 through a collection of tower 
records and overflight authorizations.  While Roberts International Airport in 
Monrovia had no record of any landings or departures by an aircraft registered 
EL-ALY, overflight and landing authorizations of several adjacent West African 
countries list this aircraft as flying over or landing upon departing or traveling to 
Monrovia.272  Additionally, the call-sign used for many of these flights is assigned 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization to an airline in Ontario, 
Canada.273 
3. Event 3: Ugandan AK-47s Diverted on Return 
Success in the illicit arms brokering and transportation business is 
dependent upon establishing a comprehensive network of individuals that are 
attune to buyers needs and the arms availability of suppliers.  In October 2000, a 
batch of one thousand assault rifles delivered to the Ugandan military by the 
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Slovak Republic was determined to be unsatisfactory.  The original deal was 
brokered by the Egyptian-national, Sharif Al-Masri, of the brokerage company 
Culworth Investments.  Al-Masri was involved in making arrangements to return 
the weapons from Uganda to the original manufacturer in the Slovak Republic 
when he found a new buyer in Guinea.274 
In the original deal with the Slovak Republic, the Ugandan military agreed 
that the rifles would not be re-exported to another user.  Uganda was not aware 
of the deal being brokered by Al-Masri with the new buyer.  The buyer was the 
Guinea-based Pecos Company and arrangements were made through its 
representative, Peter Jusko.  At the time, Jusko was also the director of the arms 
brokerage company Joy Slovakia, who along with Alexander Islamov was 
involved in brokering an illicit deal for Liberia that included the sale of Mi-24 HIND 
attack helicopters from Kyrgyzstan.275  In the case of the returned weapons from 
Uganda, Pecos would act as a buying agent and purchase the weapons through 
Al-Masri using an end-user certificate signed by the Director of Cabinet of the 
Guinean Ministry of Defense.  This end-user certificate was dated July 2, 2000, 
almost 5-months prior to the initial shipment of weapons to Uganda. 
The United Nations panel of experts investigating this case described 
Pecos as “a front company for illicit arms imports into Africa for arms exporting 
countries.”276  The company was established in Conakry, Guinea, in 1997 by 
Slovak-national Peter Jusko and Guinean citizen Mohamed Yasané.  Pecos, 
which was removed from the Guinean register of corporations in November 
2001, provided fake end-user certificates to Islamov, Bout, and Ruprah, among 
others.277  Jusko provided the end-user certificate to authorize export of the 
weapons out of Uganda.  A document resembling the air waybill, described by 
the panel of experts as “a handwritten statement that was made up to confirm the 
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loading of 1,000 of the submachine guns” was signed by the Ugandan Inspector 
General, a representative of Culworth Investments, and Pavel Popov on behalf of 
Peter Jusko of Pecos.278 
The first consignment of weapons to depart Uganda was flown by an 
Ilyushin IL-18 cargo aircraft in November, 2000.  The aircraft, which was 
presumed to be flying back to the Slovak Republic, was registered in Moldova, 
using the tail number ER-75929, and was operated by Centrafican Airlines of 
Bangui, Central African Republic.279  When the aircraft returned three days later 
to pick up a second consignment of 1,250 submachine guns, the Ugandan 
authorities became suspicious of the deal and impounded the weapons.   
The IL-18 used to smuggle the weapons out of Uganda was owned by 
Vichi, a private agent of the Moldovan Ministry of Defense.  Representatives of 
Vichi claimed that during this time-frame the aircraft had been chartered by 
MoldTransavia to conduct a passenger flight from Ras-al-Khaimah, UAE, back to 
Moldova.  The aircraft, however, was unaccounted for from November 4 to 
November 24, 2000.  The United Nations Panel of Experts would later learn that 
while in the UAE, the crew of the IL-18 was contacted by Sergei Denissenko of 
Centrafican Airlines, and agreed to contract their services to transport cargo from 
Uganda to Liberia.  The cargo was described as “technical equipment” on the 
official documentation.280 
MoldTransavia is managed by Pavel Popov who also leases aircraft from 
San Air in Sharjah, UAE.  Popov had a history of involvement with illicit arms 
trafficking while working as a logistics agent for Air Cess, a company owned and 
managed by Viktor Bout and his brother Sergei.281  He has also been described 
as “the ground manager for Victor Bout’s arms shipments from Central 
Europe.”282  It is therefore likely that Popov and Denissenko coordinated the deal 
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to use the IL-18 for flights between Uganda and Liberia.  Additionally, one day 
prior to the first flight conducted by the IL-18, Centrafrican Airlines signed a 
contract with West Africa Air Services, suggesting that more weapons were 
expected.  This document was signed by Kenyan-national, Sanjivan Ruprah.283 
Centrafrican Airlines was owned by Russian-national, Viktor Bout.284  Bout 
is described by the United Nations as well-known supplier of arms to embargoed 
nations and non-state actors who overseas a complex network of over 50 planes, 
10 airline companies, multiple cargo charter companies, and multiple freight-
forwarding companies.285  He operates out of the free trade zone in Sharjah, 
UAE, which is known as an “airport of convenience” for aircraft registered in 
many other countries.  Centrafrican obtained an Air Operator Permit from the 
Civil Aviation Authority of the Central African Republic in July, 1998, with 
authorization for the company to operate domestic flights.286  The records of the 
Civil Aviation Authority indicate that Centrafican’s fleet was limited to three 
aircraft.  However, it was discovered in early-2000 that a Director of Civil Aviation 
worked directly with Victor Bout to obtain false permits for about 20 aircraft that 
operated throughout the world.287 
The United Nations concluded that Centrafican, San Air, and 
MoldTransavia, are one in the same company and are used by Viktor Bout and 
his partners to disguise their activity.  An example of this relationship traces the 
lineage of one aircraft registered with Centrafrican in Bangui, but insured through 
San Air of the UAE, and received flight planning services such as landing and 




                                            
283 UN Security Council, S/2001/1015, para. 187. 
284 Ibid., para. 272. 
285 UN Security Council, S/2000/1195, 11. 
286 UN Security Council, S/2001/1015, para. 273. 
287 Ibid., para. 274. 
89 
conducted under Centrafrican’s three letter designator, CET, and the billing 
address for accounts payable is Transavia Travel Agency which shares an 
address with San Air in the UAE.288 
4. Event 4: Slobodan Tešic Brokers Serbian Weapons 
Between 2000 and 2002, increasing international pressure on brokers and 
transportation agents resulted in several arrests or international warrants for 
arrest.  This did not stop the flow of arms into Liberia, but rather led to the 
emergence of additional brokers who would employ the same tactics and often 
utilize the existing transportation networks.  One such case is that of Slobodan 
Tešic, who between June and August 2002 orchestrated the delivery of over 200 
tons of weapons into Liberia aboard civilian cargo aircraft.289  The panel of 
experts found that inventories of weapons delivered over the course of these six 
flights was a near identical match to a sequence of weapons shipments that 
originated from Belgrade, Serbia, and claimed to be destined for Nigeria.  
Additionally, serial numbers of weapons listed on the end-user certificates that 
identified Nigeria as the recipient were later discovered in the possession of both 
AFL troops and LURD rebel fighters in Liberia.290  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for Nigeria would later declare that “end-user certificates purportedly issued by 
the Nigerian Government for the purchase of arms and ammunition from a 
Yugoslav company are not, repeat not, genuine documents.”291 
The dynamics of this grey market arms deal illustrate the complicated web 
of forgery and deceit employed by unscrupulous brokers to supply prohibited 
buyers with weapons and ammunition.  The central figure in this particular 
transaction, which included 5,000 M70 AB2 (7.62 x 39 mm) automatic rifles, was 
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the arms broker Slobodan Tešic and his partner Orhan Dragas of the Serbian-
based Temex Company.  Tešic’s efforts to make the deal appear legitimate 
include erroneous or fraudulently produced packing lists, cargo manifests, bills of 
lading, flight plans, and two Nigerian end-user certificates.292  Tešic would 
involve several intermediaries to include Nigerian-based Aruna Import Company, 
the Liberian-based Finding Investment Company, Liechtenstein-based Waxom 
Company, and the Serbian-based freight forwarder Interjug AS.  The Finding 
Investment Company initially acted as a consignee for the falsely declared end-
user during the first series of shipments until Yugoslav authorities requested 
Temex use a company without ties to Liberia.293  The Waxom Company would 
later fill this role while still maintaining the Nigerian Ministry of Defense as its 
ultimate client.  Interjug AS would remain involved throughout the entire weapons 
deal making arrangements for false documents to include the paperwork for 
flights that identified Lagos, Nigeria, as the final destination.294 
Financing the deal involved a complicated chain of actors that Tešic later 
revealed would originate with a $500,000 payment from the Aruna Import 
Company.295  A summary of invoices compared to the bank transfers and cash 
deposits for the weapons reveals that Tešic may have underreported his profits 
in an effort to avoid suspicion of money-laundering activity.  The United Nations 
panel of experts determined that in order to appear in compliance with Serbian 
law, Tešic would have to ensure that the value of weapons he alleged to have 
exported to Nigeria was commensurate to the incoming money flow.  Any 
additional money “he had been able to earn for his sanction-busting efforts” 
would be hidden through an elaborate scheme using Waxom and their Swiss 
bank accounts.296  The full extent of this financial process was left unsolved by 
the last panel of experts’ report on the subject, but it involved additional banks in 
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Lebanon, Switzerland, and Bulgaria, and a British Virgin Island registered 
company that transferred money between them.297 
Transporting the weapons from Belgrade to Monrovia would prove to be 
an equally baffling process that involved a separate freight forwarder, contracted 
and leased aircraft, and false flight plans.  Interjug AS initially contracted the 
delivery of arms to the Serbian-based air charter company Aviogenex.  The first 
four consignments of weapons were further subcontracted to Aerocom, a 
Moldovan-registered airline associated with Viktor Bout and later shut down for 
suspicion of arms trafficking activity.298  Interjug and Aviogenex arranged the 
final flights through an arrangement with Ducor World Airlines, which would later 
be shut down following a ban by the European Union in March, 2006, for illicit 
weapons flights into Africa.299  The Liberian national Emanuel Shaw, managing 
director of LoneStar Airways and an economic advisor to President Taylor, 
worked with Interjug and Aviogenex throughout this process and was likely 
instrumental in coordinating the arrival of illicit flights into Liberia.  Each of the six 
flight authorizations obtained by the United Nations panel of experts investigating 
the case indicated Lagos as the final destination.  Other authorizations such as 
the individual over-flight requests, however, show that each of the six aircraft was 
bound for Monrovia.300  Shaw’s aviation expertise and government connections 
proved to be an invaluable asset in the coordination of these sanction busting 
flights. 
This illicit weapons deal proved to be very lucrative for Tešic and the 
Temex Corporation.  A United Nations report in late-2003 concluded that the 
company may have cleared between $3 and 4 million by doubling the price from 
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$129 to $294 off the 5,000 AK-47 derivative assault rifles delivered to Liberia.301  
The profit margin for ammunition was even higher.  This particular case involved 
several actors, some of whom were complicit with the violations that occurred 
and others who were innocently drawn in by Tešic or one of his intermediaries.  
Graphically visualizing this network can be a useful analytical tool to confirm what 
is already known about the significance of each individual and the associated 
organizations.  This will also be the first step in developing a comprehensive 
understanding of the complexity and commonality between networks that may 
ostensibly appear to work in isolation of one another.   
D. ANALYSIS 
The Coalition for International Justice has documented 42 multi-ton 
weapons shipments that arrived in Liberia during the presidency of Charles 
Taylor.302  This organization further claims that while international authorities 
occasionally seized illicit weapons shipments destined for Liberia, Taylor used a 
variety of middlemen and weapons merchants to maintain “unimpeded access to 
international markets throughout his presidency.”  The four cases described 
above are not intended to provide a comprehensive outline of all weapon imports 
into Liberia, but rather a small sample that illustrates the various techniques for 
illicit arms trafficking that involve delivery by civil aircraft.  The actors involved in 
each of these cases possess a source of relational ties based on their 
association with an organization and through their participation in a specific 
trafficking event that can be used for social network analysis.303 
1. Data Collection 
To perform analysis on these networks, social relations between 
individuals and organizations must be measured and coded.304  The traditional 
method to collect data on social relations involves direct contact with the 
individuals to be studied in order to determine the structure of an identified social 
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entity.  The data used to describe proliferation networks in this thesis, however, is 
limited to archived reports written primarily by United Nation panels of experts 
investigating arms embargo violations.  Without the luxury of questioning each of 
the brokers, transportation agents, financiers, and buyers involved in these illicit 
deals, other methods of data collection must be employed.  To start with, each of 
the individual actors participating in the small arms supply chain for Liberia will be 
identified along with their organizational affiliation and affiliation to each of the 
four case studies.  These affiliations between individuals and organizations or 
between individuals and events are an important source of social ties considering 
that “people gather because they have similar tasks or interests and they are 
likely to interact.”305 
a. Organization Affiliation 
To organize the social network data of each actor involved in illicit 
trafficking networks, an N-dimensional matrix is created, where the N rows refer 
to the specific actors being studied and the N columns list the affiliated 
organizations.306  The presence or value of a relationship between each vertex 
depicted in the rows and columns is then indicated in the intersecting cell of the 
matrix.307  The row vertices of the matrices used for analysis in this study are 
comprised of the 38 actors identified in the four separate proliferation events.  
The organization matrix will include each of the identified organizations as 
column vertices.  The intersection between row and column, therefore, will 
indicate the presence of a relationship between an individual and that 
organization. 
For illustrative purposes the individuals and organizations of Event 
1, involving the March 1999 delivery of 68 tons of weapons to Liberia, will first be 
described in isolation of the other three events.  The primary broker who 
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arranged the delivery of small arms from the Ukraine to Liberia, by way of 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, was Leonid Minin through his Gibraltar-based 
Chartered Engineering and Technical Services company.  Minin used a signed 
end-user certificate that represented the buyer as Burkina Faso to obtain an 
export license for weapons supplied by Ukrspetsexport.  Upon delivery to Burkina 
Faso, the weapons were diverted to Liberia aboard Minin’s BAC-111 which was 
operated by the company LIMAD and used the logistic assistance of Gus Van 
Kouwenhoven.  Payments for the weapons were arranged by Lebanese business 
man Talal El-Ndine on behalf of the ultimate buyer, Charles Taylor.  These 
affiliations between individuals and organizations are depicted in the matrix 
below: 
 
  MOD Burkina 
Faso 
Ukrspetsexport Chartered Engineering 
& Technical Services 
LIMAD Liberian 
Government
Minin 1 1 1 1 1 
Diendere 1 0 0 0 0 
El-Ndine 0 0 1 0 1 
Van Kouwenhoven 0 0 1 1 0 
Taylor 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 3.   Two-Mode Organization Affiliation Matrix for Event 1 
 
This matrix of organization affiliations results in a two-mode 
network in which “vertices are divided into two sets and vertices can be related 
only to vertices in the other set.”308  One set of vertices are the individuals and 
the other set of vertices are their affiliated organizations.  The Liberian 
government and the Burkina Faso Ministry of Defense are represented as 
organizations because the associated individuals are not acting on behalf of any 
other commercial entity.  If a tie is present between an individual and an 
organization, a one is entered in the adjacent cell; if there is no tie, then a zero is 
entered. 
                                            
308 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network 
Analysis with Pajek, 103. 
95 
This two-mode network can also be viewed graphically.  The 
sociogram shown in Figure 2 graphically depicts the same data entered in the 
two-mode organization affiliation matrix from Table 3. 
 
Figure 2.   Two-Mode Organization Affiliation Sociogram for Event 1309 
 
Viewing the presence of ties in either the matrix or within the 
sociogram for Event 1 provides a visual indication of Leonid Minin’s central 
position in the network.  Another technique that can be used to visualize Minin’s 
centrality in this simple network is to convert the two-mode data into one of two 
possible one-mode data sets.  In this particular two-mode data set, the rows 
represent individuals and the columns represent organizations associated with 
the arms proliferation event.  Converting this two-mode data will result in either 
one data set of individual-by-individual ties, measuring the strength of the tie 
between each pair of individuals related to the number of common organization 
affiliations, or one data set comparing organization-by-organization ties.310  The 
values derived in this conversion are calculated by taking each entry of the row 
for one individual and multiplying it times the same entry for the next individual 
and then summing the result.  When this method is used for binary data, as was 
this original two-mode data set, the resulting value represents a count of co-
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occurrence with organizations.311  For this example, individual-by-individual ties 
are represented in the one-mode matrix depicted in Figure 3.312 
 
 
Figure 3.   One-Mode Organization Affiliation Sociogram for Event 1 
 
The matrices and sociograms presented thus far represent the 
affiliation between individuals and organizations of one isolated arms trafficking 
event.  Further analysis of the entire network requires a combined matrix of all 38 
individuals and the affiliated organizations from each event.  The matrix 
containing this data is too large for inclusion in this text; however, it is included in 
Appendix B.  The sociogram depicting the two-mode network of individual-by-
organization affiliations is more compact as reflected in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.   Two-Mode Organization Affiliation Sociogram for Events 1-4 
 
 
The nodes with the highest number of ties on this sociogram 
represent the individual or organization with the most affiliations.  Leonid Minin, 
for example, is a representative of the arms suppliers Spetstehnoexport and 
Ukrspetsexport, as well as the director of his brokering company Chartered 
Engineering and Technical Services and his holding company Sulico Holdings.  
The country of Liberia is also dense with the ties created by the members of 
Taylor’s inner-circle who serve as weapons buyers or financiers.  
b. Event Affiliation  
In addition to depicting affiliations between individuals and 
organizations, social relations can be depicted by each individual’s affiliation with 
a specific trafficking event.  A simplified version of the matrix depicting these 






  Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 
Weapons Origin Ukraine Ukraine Slovakia /  
Uganda 
Serbia 
Supplier Ukrspetsexport Spetstehnoexport Pecos Temex 
Broker Minin Minin /  
Tammivuori 
Al-Masri Tešic 
Financier El-Ndine unknown unknown Ebenezer 
Logistics Van 
Kouwenhoven 
Valery Cherny Jusko Shaw 
Transporter LIMAD West African Air 
Services 
Centrafrican Aerocom /    
Ducor 
Buyer Taylor Salame Taylor Taylor 
Table 4.   Abbreviated Event Affiliation Matrix 
 
Combining all of the individuals on the basis of their affiliation to 
each of the four events to reveals the interconnectivity of these seemingly 
isolated trafficking networks.  Within the sociogram depicted in Figure 5 there are 
four distinct subgroups created around each event.  Between each subgroup, 
however, are actors like Benoni Urey, Viktor Bout, and Sanjivan Ruprah, who act 
as bridges between two or more events. 
 
 
Figure 5.   One-Mode Event Affiliation Sociogram for Events 1-4 
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Further analysis of these trafficking events can be accomplished by 
identifying and collecting additional relational data between actors. 
c. Communications and Taylor’s Inner-Circle 
In addition to the affiliations between individuals and either 
organizations or events, network data can be representative of relational ties 
between individuals.  Throughout the literature used to present the case studies 
found in this research are many references to business partners, the current or 
former status as employees, or contractual relationships between individuals.  
Event 3, for example, involved a contract signed between Serguei Denissenko of 
San Air and Sanjivan Ruprah of West Africa Air Services that foresaw “the 
performance of several air transportations” between Uganda and Liberia.313  The 
contract between Denissenko and Ruprah establishes a relationship that is 
included in a comprehensive communication network that encompasses all of the 
individual events depicted below in Figure 6:   
 
 
Figure 6.   Combined One-Mode Communication Network 
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In addition to basic relational ties formed through business 
partnerships and contracts, this sociogram depicts the stronger communication 
ties that are present within the inner-circle of Charles Taylor.  This function is 
performed by joining two separate one-mode matrices, one representing basic 
communication ties and one representing Taylor’s inner-circle.314  Each matrix 
contains the same number of vertices and thus increased tie strength can be 
visually represented where basic communication ties overlap with inner-circle 
ties. 
The inner-circle of Charles Taylor is represented by his trusted 
government officials and Liberian-based businessmen who provide extra 
budgetary income to buy weapons.  An example of the former is Emmanuel 
Shaw who was a financial advisor to President Taylor and also owned all of the 
hangars at Robertsfield International Airport in Monrovia.315  Shaw was 
instrumental in handling the logistics of several arms deals and made the 
arrangements for transporting Temex brokered Serbian weapons in 2002 (Event 
4 of this study).   
The private and public ventures that provided financial support to 
Taylor include businesses in the timber industry and government offices such as 
the Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry (LISCR).  Gus Van 
Kouwenhoven and Leonid Minin gained notoriety through their weapon deals but 
also owned some of the largest timber businesses in Liberia.  The weapons 
deals arranged by these individuals were often performed in exchange for 
expanded concessions that benefited each of their respective companies.316  
Government officials such as Benoni Urey had both private and public ventures 
but generated the most revenue as Commissioner of the LISCR.  This registry 
“handled the flags of convenience registrations of ships from around the 
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world.”317  Urey skimmed funds from the LISCR to buy weapons at the same 
time he was working with his brother LeRoy and Sanjivan Ruprah in business 
ventures like Abidjan Freight.  This company was established to serve as the 
non-Liberian destination of multiple prohibited arms shipments. 
d. Attributes 
Each of the data structures established thus far either originate 
from or can be converted into a square, two-dimensional, actor-by-actor matrix 
that represents affiliations between each other or co-occurrence between actors 
that are affiliated with the same organizations or events.  Another type of data 
structure is called the “attribute data set” and consists of rows representing 
actors and columns that represent the attributes of each actor.318  The attributes 
collected on the 38 actors presented in this study are limited to nationality and 
role in the network.  Each actor’s role in the network is coded using the scheme 
depicted by Table 5: 
 
Network Role Coding Scheme 




Insurance Provider 4 
Freight Forwarder 5 
Transportation Agent 6 
Airline Operator 7 
Logistics 8 
Government Official 9 
Buyer 10 
Table 5.   Coding Scheme for Actor Network Roles 
 
Assigning each of the 38 actors with one of these 10 possible 
attributes allows for additional analysis based on their predominant role.  
Definitions of each of these roles and the coding scheme for nationalities can be 
found in Appendix A. 
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2. The Comprehensive Trafficking Network 
Sociograms can represent the best way to “see structure” in social 
networks.319  Freeman explains that using graphic techniques for exploring social 
network data will “reveal subsets of actors that are organized into cohesive social 
groups, and…reveal subsets of actors that occupy equivalent social positions, or 
roles.”320  Figure 7, shown below, represents the combination of each affiliation 
and attribute network described in the preceding sections. 
 
Figure 7.   Combined Network with Attributes 
 
Found within this sociogram are several visual clues that reveal 
information about specific actors and the relationship between actors.  The final 
chapter will include specific findings related to this network by introducing the 
relationship between power and centrality for specific actors.  It will also 
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demonstrate the significance of dense clusters of activity, or cohesive subgroups 
within the network that result in close social interaction between actors.  These 
findings will only confirm what is already known about proliferation networks, 
however, they will demonstrate the application of the social network analysis 
methodology to systematically dissect networks in the case that the most central 
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A. REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis was primarily focused on describing what came 
to be characterized as the “anatomy of an arms deal.”  This was accomplished 
through the compilation of the principal actors and their associated functions of 
arms trafficking networks on a supply chain flowchart.321  This flowchart and the 
detailed description of its interrelated components provided the context for further 
analysis of four case studies involving sanction busting arms flights into Liberia 
during the second civil war.  Social network analysis was used as a method to 
add a greater depth of understanding by using graphic techniques and the 
application of network terms to the actors and relations between actors found in 
illicit arms trafficking networks. 
The validation of the flowchart and subsequent discussion of the social 
relations found within proliferation networks was limited by the availability of data 
on each of the case studies.  Additional limitations such as the size of the 
network to be described were self imposed by the author.  For example, the 
combined network of actors involved in the four case studies is limited to those 
identified by the United Nations panels of experts investigating the cases from 
1999 to 2002.  Each of the organizations described in the case studies were also 
limited to those identified in these United Nations reports.  A more detailed 
analysis of the 38 network actors will reveal a myriad of additional affiliated 
organizations and additional brokers, financiers, logisticians, and transportation 
agents that are either directly or indirectly involved with illicit small arms 
proliferation.  What the limited sample size of data does provide, however, is a 
framework for the application of social network analysis to proliferation networks 
that can be filled with data from other case studies in proliferation.  This can be 
done by combining the network actor definitions from Chapter III, the discussions 
of matrices and sociograms in Chapter IV, and the case study code book found  
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in Appendix A.  Additional applications of the social network analysis 
methodology to describe illicit arms trafficking networks will be introduced in the 
final section on analytical findings. 
B. ANALYTICAL FINDINGS 
The manager of research and policy on arms control at the International 
Secretariat of Amnesty International in London is Brian Wood.  Wood recently 
wrote that arms brokers and transportation agents are integral to the global arms 
trade.  He further claims that “[b]rokering and transport networks span the globe 
helping service the trade, while the established freight industry also provides 
logistical support for the military operations of states, a conduit for the 
proliferation of arms.”322  Visualizing the combined network of event and 
organization affiliations, communications, and Taylor’s inner-circle revealed the 
centrality of both brokers and transportation agents.  This centrality can also be 
represented by the mathematic and statistical measures of social network 
analysis software.  Another major focus of social network analysis is the 
identification of dense clusters of actors which can reveal relations that are 
integral to the success of a network.  These dense clusters of actors, or cohesive 
subgroups, and the centrality of individual actors will be further explained with 
reference to small arms proliferation. 
1. Measures of Centrality 
Sociologists often describe power as a fundamental property of social 
structures.  Social network analysts compare power to the closely related 
concept of centrality.  Measures of centrality can reveal opportunities for 
individuals on the basis of their immediate connections to others or their access 
to information based on location between network actors.323  Just as the concept 
of centrality can have different implications for different actors, social network 
analysts have found different ways from which to derive centrality measures. 
                                            
322 Brian Wood, “A World of Arms Pushers and Fixers,” The Amnesty International Dossier, 
http://mondediplo.com/2006/06/12deadly (accessed November 26, 2007). 
323 Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, Introduction to Social Methods, (Riverside, CA: 
University of California, 2005), under “Chapter 10: Centrality and Power.”  
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The most common measure of centrality considers the number of direct 
ties from any one actor to others in the network.  While this value, known as 
degree centrality, can shed light on which actor has the most connections, it does 
not account for the indirect ties to all others and could result in high values for an 
individual who is central within a potentially isolated subgroup.324  Two measures 
that do consider relative relations throughout the network are closeness and 
betweenness centrality.  Closeness centrality emphasizes “the distance of an 
actor to all others in the network by focusing on the distance from each actor to 
all others.”325  The output for calculating closeness centrality will determine how 
far an actor is from all others.  The “far-ness,” therefore, is the “sum of the 
distance (by various approaches) from each ego to all others in the network.”326  
Lastly, betweenness centrality evaluates each actor on the basis of their position 
between actors.  Actors who score high in betweenness centrality are viewed to 
be in a favorable position “to the extent that the actor falls on the geodesic paths 
between other pairs of actors in the network.”327  The 12 most central actors of 
the Liberian case study are listed in Table 6 by order of betweenness centrality. 
 




1 V. Bout Broker 509.554 12 68 
37 Taylor Buyer 362.225 11 73 
27 Jovan Transport Agent 245.485 7 86 
15 Popov Transport Agent 212.603 8 82 
3 Ruprah Transport Agent 178.449 9 78 
8 Minin Broker 177.84 7 89 
28 Tešic Broker 150.333 6 104 
12 Jusko Broker 106.685 6 87 
5 Van Kouwenhoven Logistics 86.65 4 86 
19 Salame Buyer 84.75 5 93 
7 Shaw Logistics 82.917 6 89 
29 B. Urey Government Official 57.291 6 85 
 
Table 6.   Centrality Measures Rank Ordered by Betweenness 
                                            
324 Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, Introduction to Social Methods, (Riverside, CA: 





Viktor Bout, Africa’s “merchant of death,”328 scores the highest on each 
measure of centrality.  However, Aleksic Jovan who arranged transportation for a 
consignment of Serbian weapons delivered to Liberia in 2002, scores 3rd in 
betweenness, 5th in degree, and 6th for closeness centrality.  This reveals that 
Jovan’s position in the trafficking network can be described as between more 
actors that in direct connection to actors.  Trafficking weapons, like any other 
network transaction, depends on the flow of both materiel and information 
between supplier, buyer, and multiple intermediaries.  The measure of 
betweenness centrality, therefore, is perhaps the most appropriate indication of 
power in small arms proliferation networks.  Another consideration that can 
reveal central clusters of actors is the identification of cohesive subgroups. 
2. Cohesive Subgroups 
Social network analysts hypothesize that dense pockets of people who 
“stick together” are joined by more than interaction.329  These dense pockets, or 
cohesive subgroups, interact on the basis of “solidarity, shared norms, identity, 
and collective behavior.”330  Identifying subgroups and especially the incidence of 
overlap between subgroups can reveal which actors in a network are able to 
mobilize or diffuse information across the entire network.331  Individuals in this 
position are described as “bridges” between groups or “brokers” of information or 
knowledge among other actors or groups.332  Just as there were variations on 
the concept of centrality, there are many ways to distinguish subgroups from the 
larger network or isolate the actors found within overlapping subgroups. 
One method to isolate individuals who act as bridges between subgroups, 
and thus identify the associated subgroup is the Lambda set approach which 
                                            
328 Term first coined by former British Foreign Office minister for Africa, Peter Hain, during a 
speech before Parliament in 2000, quoted in Douglas Farah, The Merchant of Death: Money, 
Guns, Planes, and the Man Who Makes War Possible (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007). 
329 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network 
Analysis with Pajek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, Introduction to Social Methods, (Riverside, CA: 
University of California, 2005), under “Chapter 11: Cliques and Sub-Groups.”  
332 Ibid. 
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“ranks each of the relationships in the network in terms of importance by 
evaluating how much of the flow among actors in the net [goes] through each 
link.”333  Figure 8 depicts the hierarchical Lambda set partitions present in the 
combined Liberian trafficking network. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Hierarchical Lambda Set Partitions for Combined Network334 
 
Using this approach identifies the relationship between Viktor Bout and 
Sanjivan Ruprah as the most important in the network from the standpoint that it 
carries the most traffic and would therefore cause the most disruption to the 
network if removed.  It is worthwhile to recall that Bout is a broker and Ruprah is 
a transportation agent and identifying this relationship as the most important 
reinforces the previous statement made by Brian Wood.  
Measures of centrality and the identification of bridges between subgroups 
are just two methods among countless others found in multiple social network 
analysis software applications.  Researchers will find that once data has been 
collected and structured in a format that can be further analyzed by programs 
                                            
333 Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, Introduction to Social Methods, (Riverside, CA: 
University of California, 2005), under “Chapter 11: Cliques and Sub-Groups.” 
334 This functioned performed in UCINET by selecting Network>Subgroups>Lambda Set. 
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such as UCINET, there are many directions to take.  Some conclusions will 
reinforce what is intuitively accepted about the case study while others can 
reveal new information about what can initially appear to be an amorphous 
network. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research into small arms proliferation networks can be continued 
along several paths.  From a methodological perspective, the application of 
social network analysis to specific cases of arms trafficking was limited to 
describing relationships among actors and recording affiliations between actors 
and organizations or events.  Also present in the data, but not explored here, are 
geospatial and temporal factors that can further elucidate network characteristics.  
Furthermore, the temporal aspects of how networks change over time can be 
related to the concept of structural equivalence. 
Structural equivalence between network vertices is achieved when the 
vertices “have identical ties with themselves, each other, and all other 
vertices.”335  This concept is extended by social scientists to social positions that 
rely on specific patterns of ties and relationships.  An argument can be made that 
individuals in equivalent positions will have similar patterns of ties and 
relationships and will, therefore, occupy equivalent positions in the network.  An 
arms broker, as demonstrated in Chapter III and IV, has specific functions that 
necessitate relationships with specific arms suppliers, government officials, 
transportation agents, and buyers.  Arms brokers operating in the same region 
would likely share these relationships with other brokers.  Recalling Event 4 from 
the case studies, Slobodan Tešic emerged in Liberia following the arrest of 
Leonid Minin and Sanjivan Ruprah.  Tešic’s trafficking network exhibited traits of 
structural equivalence when compared to the organization of Minin and Al-Masri.  
For example, each broker relied on the logistics expertise of the Viktor Bout 
network through utilization of his affiliated airlines for clandestine delivery of 
arms. 
                                            
335 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network 
Analysis with Pajek, 266. 
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Structural equivalence might also apply to the airlines known to conduct 
illicit arms flights.  When the UN panel of experts initiated its investigation of 
violations on the Liberian arms embargo, a number of shady airlines ceased 
operations.  Included among these operators were San Air, West Africa Air 
Service, and Centrafrican Airlines, each of which were involved with the four 
trafficking events described in Chapter IV.  The United Nations also observed 
that others, such as Aerocom and Ducor World Airlines, were still operational.336  
An analysis of the structural equivalence exhibited between sanction busting 
airlines to include a detailed account of each of their associated aircraft would 
likely reveal that shutting down a few operators does not have an overwhelming 
impact on the operation of the network at large.  Using the concept of structural 
equivalence and analyzing the temporal element of how a network adjusts over 
time can reveal trends of illicit activity that can better inform policy designed to 
disrupt small arms proliferation. 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It has been over six years since the United Nations conducted the 
conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.  
In that time there has been significant progress to increase the oversight of the 
small arms supply chain and tighten the enforcement of national level laws and 
both regional and international instruments designed to prevent illicit brokering 
and trafficking in small arms.  However, there is still a long way to go before 
unscrupulous arms brokers and transportation agents can no longer operate with 
impunity to trade their deadly wares around the globe.  Take for example the 
BBC News report in late August 2007, just three months prior to the completion 
of this thesis, that the Sudanese government is importing weapons to Darfur in 
“breathtaking defiance” of a UN arms embargo.337  Weapons were flown into 
Sudan aboard a civilian Antonov AN-12 cargo aircraft operated by Azza Airlines, 
itself under investigation by a UN panel of experts for suspicion of sanction 
                                            
336 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 25 
of Security Council resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia, S/2003/937 (New York, NY: 
October 28, 2003), para 119. 
337 “Khartoum ‘defying Darfur embargo,’” BBC News, August 24, 2007, 
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busting flights.  Regarding this incident, Amnesty International stated that the 
“proliferation of small arms and militarized vehicles in Darfur has led to an 
increase in armed attacks on aid convoys and other devastating attacks against 
civilians.”338 
The widely accepted notion that small arms availability can both 
exacerbate and prolong conflict is once again playing out in Africa, this time in 
the Darfur region of Sudan.  The brokers and transportation agents that are 
involved with this activity have once again made civil aviation the modality of 
choice for conducting fast and relatively anonymous delivery of sanctioned 
weapons into an interior region.  As suggested by the social scientists cited in 
this research, complex problems should be reformulated in network terms to 
better inform policy.  This thesis outlined a detailed description of the global small 
arms supply chain and subsequently developed a framework to apply concepts 
of social network analysis to illicit weapons trafficking networks.  On the basis 
that an analysis of the Liberian case studies revealed what was already known 
about the most central actors involved with violations of the sanctions against 
President Charles Taylor, an analysis of proliferation networks in Sudan may 
reveal actors who have not yet been identified by the international community.   
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APPENDIX A: LIBERIAN CASE STUDY CODE BOOK 
This code book is intended to provide defining parameters for each of the 
matrices constructed from the Liberian arms trafficking case studies presented in 
Chapter IV.  The first part describes the attributes collected on the 38 individuals 
identified in the analysis of each case study.  The second part identifies each of 
the affiliations that were used to represent social relationships between actors.   
 
1. ATTRIBUTE DATA 
 
A. Nationality: This two-mode attribute matrix depicts the country of 
nationality for each actor.  This is generally described in the UN panel of 
expert reports on the basis of passport, citizenship, or a comment such as, 
“Kenyan-national, Sajivan Ruprah…” 
 
Coding Scheme: 


















18) Ivory Coast 
19) Burkina Faso 
20) Finland 
 
B. Role:  Describes the dominant role of an individual within the arms 
proliferation network.  Each of the codes listed below were not used during 
the course of analyzing the four events presented in this thesis.  
Additionally, some of the roles can be further disaggregated.  For 




those who grant export licenses to airport customs inspectors.  These 








4) Insurance Provider 
5) Freight Forwarder 
6) Transportation Agent 
7) Airline Operator 
8) Logistics 
9) Government Official 
10) Buyer 
 
C. Centrality Measures:  The measures for degree, betweenness, and 
closeness centrality are included in the attribute data.  These measures 
can subsequently be displayed while visualizing the network without 
having to recompute the values. 
 
D. Description:  The description for each of the 38 actors is derived 
from the literature used for the case studies and the UN list of assets 
frozen by resolution 1532 (2004) and the travel ban imposed by resolution 
1521 (2003). 
 
2. AFFILIATION DATA 
 
A. Event affiliation: This 38 x 4, two-mode matrix, represents each 
actor’s affiliation to the four arms trafficking events presented in Chapter 
IV.  Each individual is coded with a one or a zero on the basis that they 
were or were not affiliated with each event. 
 
List of Events: 
1) Event 1: Leonid Minin’s 68-ton arms shipment 
2) Event 2: Minin’s second consignment of weapons 
3) Event 3: Ugandan AK-47s diverted on return 
4) Event 4: Slobodan Tešic brokers Serbian weapons 
 
B. Organization affiliation: This 38 x 30, two-mode matrix, represents 
each actor’s affiliation to 30 organizations identified in the four arms 
trafficking events presented in Chapter IV.  In the absence of affiliation 
between an individual and a commercial entity, such as was the case for 
President Charles Taylor, the represented country was used. 
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List of Organizations: 
1) Burkina Faso 
2) Ukrspetsexport 
3) Chartered Engineering & Technical Services 
4) LIMAD 
5) Liberia 
6) Ivory Coast 
7) Spetstehnoexport 
8) Sulico Holdings 
9) MET A.S. 
10) Aviatrend 




15) San Air 
16) Centrafrican 
17) Culworth Investment 
18) Central African Republic 
19) Equatorial Guinea 
20) Nigeria 
21) Temex 
22) Aruna Import 
23) Finding Investment 
24) Waxom 
25) Interjug A.S. 
26) LoneStar Airways 
27) Ducor World Airways 
28) Aerocom 
29) Jeff Corp. 
30) Aviogenex 
 
C. Communication Data: This 38 x 38, one-mode matrix, represents 
relational ties between actors on the basis of communication.  
Communication between actors was assessed by references in the 
literature to business partners, the current of former status as employees, 
or contractual relationships between individuals. 
 
D. Taylor’s Inner-Circle Data: This 38 x 38, one-mode matrix, 
represents relational ties between President Charles Taylor and each 
individual described to be part of his “inner-circle.”  The inner-circle is 
referenced in the literature and often describes trusted government 
officials and Liberian-based businessmen who provided extra budgetary 
income to the former president. 
126 
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 APPENDIX B: LIBERIAN ARMS TRAFFICKING NETWORKS 
















































v1 Viktor Bout 2 1 509.554 12 68 
Arms broker and transporter of weapons who 
controls a vast network of freight forwarding, 
brokerage, and aviation companies.  Assets 
frozen by paragraph 1 of UNSC resolution 
1532 (2004). 
v2 Serguei Bout 2 1 1.5 3 97 
Brother of Viktor Bout, manager of San Air 
General Trading and associated companies. 
v3 Sanjivan Ruprah 6 2 178.449 9 78 
Arms dealer and the former Deputy 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Maritime 
Affairs. Set up Abidjan Freight to coordinate 
Viktor Bout's arms shipments into Liberia. 
Assets frozen by paragraph 1 of UNSC 
resolution 1532 (2004). 
v4 Carlos Alberto La Plaine 6 3 0 3 102 
Diamond dealer and associate of Sanjivan 
Ruprah.  
v5 Gus van Kouwenhoven 8 4 86.65 4 86 
Owner of Hotel Africa and President of the 
Oriental Timber Company which provides 
extra budgetary income to President Taylor. 
Provides logistical support to illict arms 
imports. Assets frozen by paragraph 1 of 
UNSC resolution 1532 (2004). 
v6 El-Ndine 3 5 0 1 122 
Lebanese businessman. Paymaster of ex-
President Taylor’s inner circle. Subject to a 
UN travel ban imposed by paragraph 4 of 
UNSC resolution 1521 (2003). 
v7 Emmanuel Shaw 8 6 82.917 6 89 
Director of Lonestar airways and Lonestar 
Communications. Former economic advisor 
to President Taylor. Assets frozen by 
paragraph 1 of UNSC resolution 1532 (2004).
v8 Leonid Minin 2 7 177.84 7 89 
Arms dealer and owner of Exotic Tropical 
Timber Enterprises which provided extra 
budgetary income to President Taylor. Assets 
frozen by paragraph 1 of UNSC resolution 
1532 (2004). 
v9 Valery Cherny 6 1 0 1 125 
Owner of Aviatrend and associate of Minin. 
v10 Alexander Islamov 2 1 7.233 5 108 
Arms broker and partner of the Pecos 
Company. 
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v11 Mohamed Yansane 2 8 0 4 109 
Helped Jusko to establish the Pecos 
Company. 
v12 Peter Jusko 2 9 106.685 6 87 
Arms broker and owner of Joy Slovakia and 
later established Pecos Company to conduct 
illicit arms sales. 
v13 Jacob Berger 2 7 9.604 5 106 
Arms broker associated with the Pecos 
Company. 
v14 Serguei Denissenko 6 1 29.691 6 91 
General manager of San Air General Trading 
and commercial manager of Centrafrican 
Airlines. 
v15 Pavel Popov 6 10 212.603 8 82 
General manger of MoldTransavia and 
considered to be Viktor Bout's ground 
manager for Central European operations. 
v16 Sharif al-Masri 2 11 0 1 152 
Egyptian arms broker. 
v17 Mr. Muko 2 0 0 2 116 Arms broker and associate of Sharif Al-Masri.
v18 Andrei Grosul 6 10 33.241 5 90 General Director of Renan Air Company. 
v19 Mohamed Salame 10 5 84.75 5 93 
Owner of Mohamed and Company Logging 
Company which provided extra budgetary
income to President Taylor. Assets frozen by 
paragraph 1 of UNSC resolution 1532 (2004).
v20 Valeriy Naydo 6 12 0 1 104 
A former pilot for Viktor Bout and a director a 
Bout front company. Assets frozen by 
paragraph 1 of UNSC resolution 1532 (2004).
v21 Armand Doungovo 9 13 0 2 103 
Director of Civil Aviation of the Central African 
Republic. Assisted Viktor Bout and others to 
obtain registration for aircraft considered to 
be non airworthy and involved with sanction 
busting arms flights. 
v22 Mr. Bouroukine 6 13 0.75 3 101 
Local manager of Centrafican Airlines. 
v23 Randolph Cooper 9 6 0 1 109 
Former Managing Director of Robertsfield 
International Airport. Associate of Charles 
Taylor. Assets frozen by paragraph 1 of 
UNSC resolution 1532 (2004). 
v24 Ibrahim Bah 9 14 0 2 106 
Arms dealer, buyer, involved in illicit diamond 
sales to provide extrabudgetart income to 
President Taylor. Subject to a UN travel ban 
imposed by paragraph 4 of UNSC resolution 
1521 (2003). 
v25 Orhan Dragas 2 15 47.667 4 95 
Business partner of Slobodan Tesic. 
Introduced Tesic to arms buyers in Liberia. 
Subject to a UN travel ban imposed by 
paragraph 4 of UNSC resolution 1521 (2003).
v26 Duane Egli 6 6 0 1 122 
Chief Executive Officer of Ducor World 
Airlines. Subject to a UN travel ban imposed 
by paragraph 4 of UNSC resolution 1521 
(2003). 
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v27 Aleksic Jovan 6 15 245.485 7 86 
Employee of the Serbian company Aviogenex 
and associate of Tesic and Dragas. Subject 
to a UN travel ban imposed by paragraph 4 of 
UNSC resolution 1521 (2003). 
v28 Slobodan Tesic 2 15 150.333 6 104 
Arms broker and Director of Temex, 
Belgrade, Serbia. Subject to a UN travel ban 
imposed by paragraph 4 of UNSC resolution 
1521 (2003). 
v29 Benoni Urey 9 6 57.291 6 85 
Ex-Commissioner of Maritime Affairs of 
Liberia, business associate of Sanjivan 
Ruprah. Assets frozen by paragraph 1 of 
UNSC resolution 1532 (2004). 
v30 LeRoy Urey 6 6 22.415 5 95 
Former Liberian Deputy Minister for 
Administration and Public Safety. Brother of 
Benoni Urey, representative of West African 
Air Services. 
v31 Mr. Ebenezer 3 16 0 1 140 
Representative of Aruna Import and associate 
of Orhan Dragas. 
v32 Petar Sinapov 8 17 0 1 140 
Associate of Jeff Corporation, facilitated 
money transfers between Waxom and Tesic 
v33 Robert Guei 10 18 0 1 129 Former Cote d'Ivoire head of state 
v34 Ljubo Milenkovic 5 15 0 2 119 
Forwarding agent and representative of 
Interjug AS. 
v35 Glibert Diendere 10 19 0 1 125 
Head of Burkina Faso Presidential Guard, 
signed EUC for Mar 13, 1999 delivery of 68 
tons of weapons to Burkina Faso and later 
diverted to Liberia 
v36 Erkki Tammivuori 2 20 0 3 100 
Representative of Met A.S. Company and 
associate of Leonid Minin. 
v37 Charles Taylor 10 6 362.225 11 73 
Former President of Liberia. Assets frozen by 





10 6 31.117 5 90 
Associate, advisor, and son of President 
Taylor. Assets frozen by paragraph 1 of 
UNSC resolution 1532 (2004). 
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B. EVENT AFFILIATION DATA 
 
 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4
V. Bout 0 0 1 1 
S. Bout 0 0 0 0 
Ruprah 0 1 1 0 
La Plaine 0 1 1 0 
V. Kouwenhoven 1 0 0 0 
El-Ndine 1 0 0 0 
Shaw 0 0 0 1 
Minin 1 1 0 0 
Cherny 0 1 0 0 
Islamov 0 0 1 0 
Yansane 0 0 1 0 
Jusko 0 0 1 0 
Berger 0 0 1 0 
Denissenko 0 0 1 0 
Popov 0 0 1 0 
al-Masri 0 0 1 0 
Muko 0 0 1 0 
Grosul 0 1 1 0 
Salame 0 1 0 0 
Naydo 0 0 0 0 
Doungovo 0 0 0 0 
Bouroukine 0 0 1 0 
Cooper 0 0 0 0 
Bah 0 0 0 0 
Dragas 0 0 0 1 
Egli 0 0 0 1 
Jovan 0 0 0 1 
Tesic 0 0 0 1 
B. Urey 0 1 0 1 
L. Urey 0 1 0 0 
Ebenezer 0 0 0 1 
Sinapov 0 0 0 1 
Guei 0 1 0 0 
Milenkovic 0 0 0 1 
Diendere 1 0 0 0 
Tammivuori 0 1 0 0 
Taylor 1 0 1 1 
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V. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ruprah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
La Plaine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
V. Kouwenhoven 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
El-Ndine 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shaw 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minin 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cherny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Islamov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Yansane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Jusko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Berger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Denissenko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Popov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
al-Masri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Muko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grosul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Salame 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Naydo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Doungovo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bouroukine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cooper 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bah 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dragas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egli 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jovan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tesic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
L. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ebenezer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sinapov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guei 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Milenkovic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Diendere 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tammivuori 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

















































































































V. Bout 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
S. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ruprah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
La Plaine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V. Kouwenhoven 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
El-Ndine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shaw 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Minin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cherny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Islamov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yansane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jusko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Berger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denissenko 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Popov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
al-Masri 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Muko 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grosul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Salame 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Naydo 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Doungovo 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bouroukine 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cooper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dragas 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egli 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Jovan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tesic 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
L. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ebenezer 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sinapov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Guei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Milenkovic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Diendere 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tammivuori 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor Jr. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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V. Bout 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
S. Bout 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Ruprah 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
La Plaine 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V. Kouwenhoven 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
El-Ndine 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shaw 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minin 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cherny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Islamov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Yansane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Jusko 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Berger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Denissenko 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Popov 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
al-Masri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Muko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Grosul 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Salame 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Naydo 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Doungovo 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bouroukine 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cooper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dragas 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egli 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jovan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tesic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Urey 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L. Urey 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ebenezer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sinapov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Milenkovic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Diendere 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tammivuori 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

























































































V. Bout 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
S. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ruprah 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
La Plaine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
V. Kouwenhoven 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
El-Ndine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shaw 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Minin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Cherny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Islamov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yansane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jusko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Berger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denissenko 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Popov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
al-Masri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Muko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grosul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salame 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Naydo 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doungovo 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bouroukine 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cooper 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Bah 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Dragas 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Egli 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jovan 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Tesic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
B. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
L. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ebenezer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sinapov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guei 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Milenkovic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Diendere 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Tammivuori 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Taylor 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Taylor Jr. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
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V. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ruprah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
La Plaine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V. Kouwenhoven 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
El-Ndine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shaw 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cherny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Islamov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yansane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jusko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Berger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denissenko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Popov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
al-Masri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Muko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grosul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Salame 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Naydo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Doungovo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bouroukine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cooper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dragas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egli 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jovan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tesic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ebenezer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sinapov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Milenkovic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Diendere 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tammivuori 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

























































































V. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S. Bout 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ruprah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
La Plaine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
V. Kouwenhoven 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
El-Ndine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Shaw 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Minin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Cherny 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Islamov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yansane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jusko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Berger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denissenko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Popov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
al-Masri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Muko 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grosul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salame 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Naydo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doungovo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bouroukine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cooper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Bah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Dragas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Egli 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jovan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tesic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
L. Urey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ebenezer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sinapov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Milenkovic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Diendere 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tammivuori 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taylor 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Taylor Jr. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
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